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ABSTRACT 
 Antibase sentiments in Okinawa challenge the U.S.–Japan alliance and restrain 
U.S. military operations at a moment when the balance of power is shifting in East Asia. 
U.S. bases in Japan are vital for maintaining a credible forward presence that safeguards 
allied interests. Sustained pressure from protest has compelled the USMC to reduce force 
posture by repositioning farther from the region. The Defense Policy Review Initiative 
(DPRI) outlines the plan to realign 55% of the force from Okinawa, predominantly to 
Guam, by FY2031. To explain the pressure on U.S. access, this thesis identifies the most 
significant drivers of U.S. base protest in four general categories: proximity, sovereignty, 
democratic responsiveness, and external threat perception. Within each category, factors 
were examined from general, Japan-, and Okinawa-specific vantages to delineate their 
significance in explaining protest. The analysis finds that proximity and external threat 
perception significantly influence protest. The DPRI has mitigated many drivers of 
protest, specifically those associated with factors identified in Okinawa, suggesting 
protest will decrease in the region. However, such actions also inhibit military operations. 
The U.S.–Japan alliance must achieve a Host Nation Support Agreement that 
complements the DPRI to enable multilateral military operations intent on enforcing the 
authority of the internationally recognized order within the region. 
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Antibase sentiments in Okinawa challenge the United States–Japan alliance and 
restrain U.S. military operations at a moment when the balance of power is shifting in East 
Asia. U.S. bases in Japan are vital for maintaining a credible forward presence that 
safeguards U.S. interests and Japan’s security. However, Okinawan protest has pressured 
policymakers to reduce or eliminate U.S. presence. Over the last two decades, the sustained 
pressure of protest has compelled the Marine Corps to reduce forces near densely populated 
areas—and to move them farther away from the region. The Defense Policy Review 
Initiative (DPRI) outlines the Marine Corps’ plan to realign 55% of the force from 
Okinawa, predominantly to Guam, by FY 2031. To explain what causes political pressure 
over U.S. access in Okinawa, this thesis identifies the most significant drivers of U.S. base 
protest, in four general categories: proximity, violation of sovereignty, democratic 
responsiveness, and external threat perception. Within each general category, factors that 
incite protest were examined at general, Japan-, and Okinawa-specific levels to delineate 
their significance in helping explain protest. The analysis finds that proximity and external 
threat perception significantly influence levels of protest. Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma observes the most protest because of perceived sovereignty violations 
and factors of proximity. The DPRI has mitigated many drivers of protest in Guam—
specifically, those associated with factors of proximity identified in Okinawa—suggesting 
U.S. base protest overall will decrease in the region. However, such actions also inhibit 
military operations. The thesis argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance must achieve a Host 
Nation Support Agreement to complement the DPRI that enables multilateral military 
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1 
I. U.S. BASES, INTERESTS, AND PROTEST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Antibase sentiments in Okinawa challenge the United States–Japan alliance and 
U.S. military operations in East Asia at a critical juncture in the region’s shifting balance 
of power. While the bases support both vital U.S. interests and Japan’s security, Okinawan 
protest pressures both U.S. and Japanese policymakers to reduce or eliminate U.S. 
presence. Over the last two decades the sustained pressure of protest has compelled the 
Marine Corps to reduce forces near densely populated areas—and to move them farther 
away from the region. Though Okinawa only represents 1% of Japan’s total population, 
protests have effectively altered and significantly impacted Marine Corps strategy and 
operations in the Pacific. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) outlines the Marine 
Corps’ plan to realign 55% of the force from Okinawa, with approximately 4,100 Marines 
to be shifted from Okinawa to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 1,300 to Australia, and 800 to the 
continental U.S. by FY 2031.1 Managing the basing issue in Okinawa is critical to the 
resilience of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and to military readiness for addressing emerging 
threats in the Indo-Pacific Theater. 
This thesis identifies significant drivers of protest and groups them into four general 
categories to explain U.S. base protest: proximity, violation of sovereignty, democratic 
responsiveness, and external threat perception. Within the general category of proximity, 
the distance between the base and host populations relative to population density proves to 
be the most statistically significant variable in explaining levels of protest, via exposure to 
military operations, vehicular accidents and servicemember crime. The general analysis 
seeks to explain the variation associated with variables of protest for U.S. bases in East 
 
1 Brian Lepore, Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DOD Should Resolve Capability 
Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates, GAO-17-415 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2017), 10.; Shawn Snow and Todd South, “Congress Wants a Review 




Asia, and in particular for Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma—the most protested 
U.S. base in Japan.2 
The identified protest drivers – especially proximity, including exposure to 
exercises and U.S. service member criminal activity – are likely to remain the greatest 
drivers of protest in Okinawa into the near future. If it is presumed that protest will remain 
relatively consistent, then it is likely that democratic responsiveness or elevated external 
threat perception will have the greatest influence on levels of protest through the 
implementation of the DPRI. The U.S. and the Government of Japan (GOJ) maintain the 
advantage of time and resources compared to the recent modern era of U.S. base 
protesters—as noted by one Okinawan protester who needed to return to Tokyo to “resume 
his study of foreign relations, because he needed to eventually get a job and earn a living.”3  
On Guam, the DPRI has mitigated several drivers of protest that were identified in 
Japan and South Korea. Guamanians are U.S. citizens and have historically exhibited 
higher levels of favorability toward U.S. military presence than that observed in South 
Korea and Okinawa, and this makes the likelihood of future significant mobilized protest 
comparatively low. Protests in Guam, while comparatively small-in-size and less frequent, 
have generally addressed sovereignty issues such as land rights, desire for federal voting 
rights, and environmental protectionism. The DPRI is also largely a transfer of Marines 
from Okinawa to Guam; and characteristics that make Marines unique from other services, 
including that one contingent of the force that will deploy on a rotational basis, are 
anticipated to have a degree of social impact on the Guamanian population.  
The research concentrates on U.S. base protest in Japan, and specifically Okinawa, 
to delineate the impact the DPRI will have in Okinawa and Guam. Its assessments suggests 
that over time, the DPRI will likely decrease overall base protest in East Asia, to include 
Guam. However, the U.S.-Japan alliance must agree to a Host Nation Support Agreement 
 
2 Charmaine N. Willis, “Incidents, Accidents, and Activists: An Analysis of Anti-US Military Base 
Mobilization in Japan,” Midwest Political Science Association Conference (New York: University at 
Albany, 2018), 4. 
3 Mayuko Ono and Tim Kelly, “Outnumbered and Elderly, Okinawa Protesters Oppose U.S. Military 
Runway,” Reuters, April 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-okinawa-henoko/outnumbered-
and-elderly-okinawa-protesters-oppose-u-s-military-runway-idUSKCN1RF0KC. 
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that supports a credible forward posture in East Asia that enforces the authority of the 
international order.  
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORWARD U.S. BASES 
As history has demonstrated and the future necessitates, the United States 
will continue to play a key role as a force for regional stability in the Indo-
Pacific in support of U.S. diplomatic and economic aspirations. To do so, 
the United States must be prepared by sustaining a credible combat-forward 
posture; strengthening alliances and building new partnerships; and 
promoting an increasingly networked region. 
—Department of Defense4 
The United States maintains approximately 587 bases that span 42 countries and 
the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on sustained access to foreign territory to enforce 
the internationally recognized—rules based—order.5 The U.S. forward posture “assures 
allies, dissuades potential challengers, deters our enemies, and [is capable of] defeating 
aggression if necessary.”6 The countries with the second greatest number of foreign bases 
are France and the United Kingdom with roughly 12 each, and Russia is fourth with 9.7 
The Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) operates one foreign base in Ambouli, Djibouti, 
adjacent to the Djibouti–Ambouli International Airport, to assist in anti-piracy operations. 
Foreign bases enhance “proximate power,” as “the ability to project power declines with 
distance.”8 U.S. defense strategists argue that persistent forward access supports capacity 
for contingency response through four major methods: 
 
4 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a 
Networked Region (Washington, DC: DOD, 2019), 3. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-
1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF 
5 Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), 34. 
6 Michael Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative costs 
and Strategic Benefits, RR-201-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 73. https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR201.pdf. 
7 John Glaser, Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture is 
Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous, CATO Institute (Washington, D.C.: CATO, 2017), 4. 
8 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (Spring, 1985), 10. 
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• In-place forces enabling response to high-consequence, low-probability 
major events, in conjunction with longer reach assets 
• global infrastructure to enable high-volume force flows for major wars 
and rapid response to smaller contingencies in unpredictable locations 
• seaborn forces to also respond quickly to globally dispersed, 
unpredictable, small-scale contingencies and major events 
• basing access to enable air; intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR); and logistics support from nearby safe havens. 
(Lostumbo et al., 2013, 37)  
The bases support three core U.S. interests:  
• provide security for Americans and allies 
• expand trade and economic opportunities 
• support democratic norms. (Green et al., 2016, 32–43)  
The United States National Security Strategy directs the Department of Defense to 
be globally present and responsive. Access abroad to key ports, air bases, and troop staging 
areas is critical to employment options and response times.  
1. Reinforcing Order through Deterrence  
The DOD’s capacity to deter adversaries by discouraging actions through fear of 
consequence is correlated with proximity, capability, and credibility. A recent RAND study 
quantified the deterrent value associated with different types of forward positioned military 
assets, “U.S. forward posture indeed generally has deterrent effects when deployed near 
the ally or partner state to be defended.”9 It was identified that ground forces have the 
greatest influence on deterrence compared to air or naval assets, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Findings also suggested that permanently stationed ground forces, such as the Marines in 
Okinawa, are the greatest asset to signal resolve to both allies and adversaries.10  
 
9 Bryan Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, RR2533 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), xvi, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/
RR2533/RAND_RR2533.pdf. 
10 Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, 11. 
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Figure 1. Deterrence: Statistical Results for Nearby U.S. Forces11 
2. Reinforcing Order through Compellence 
Forward bases significantly enhance U.S. compellence efforts, or the capacity to 
coerce an opponent to act in a desired manner, that are increasingly being applied for 
dipomatic ends. The capabaility and credibility associated with the threat, as factors of 
proximity, were identified as the most significant variables in changing the belligerent’s 
actions or policy.12 Chamberlain illustrates that from 1945 to 2007, the “target [country] 
conceded to U.S. demands before the application of force in eight of the nineteen crises in 
which the United States issued a comellent threat.”13 Within her sample size of 63 
 
11 Source: Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, 36.  
12 Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak 
States. Cheap Threats (Washington: DC, Georgetown University Press, 2016), 70, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/j.ctt1c3sndc. 
13 Chamberlain, Cheap Threats, 70. 
6 
instances, she identified an increasing trend in the utilization of compellence compared to 
that of the period during the Cold War.14  
There is statistical significance between the capable and credible threat and the 
success rate associated with the applicatoin of deterrence or compellence. A large ground 
force, in proximity to the belligerent, was identified as the greatest influence on both 
detterence and compellence. This suggests that a forward positioned ground force is the 
greatest asset for achieving changed behavior or policy in a belligerent.  
U.S. forces to do not have to serve as the front-line-effort for partners’ and allies’ 
security posture to maintain the advantages of a forward presence: balanced security 
cooperation is more sustainable. The glue of the U.S. military alliance network is security 
cooperation operations that “encourage and enable international partners to work with the 
United States to achieve strategic objectives.”15 Security cooperation builds partner 
capacity and capability, integrates long term asset supply chains, and creates a more 
adaptable and resilient security structure within a given region. Security cooperation 
enhances military interoperability, creates trust in a unity of effort, enhances relationships, 
establishes norms for interactions, and demonstrates resolve within the alliance structure. 
These benefits have significant residual impacts on diplomatic and economic cooperation. 
The tempo for such operations in Northeast Asia is constant, bases are required to facilitate 
cooperation efforts.  
Calder suggests that it would cost the United States over $100 billion to replace its 
bases overseas.16 He proposes a “Fortress America” strategy through which the United 
States withdraws from foreign bases and allocates resources to enhance “nuclear, naval, 
and long-range aerospace capabilities, and [to] leverage its global influence through a 
detached, balance-of-power oriented ‘offshore-balancing’ strategy.”17 Calder accepts this 
is contrary to realist tendencies to support direct foreign military presence to foster 
 
14 Chamberlain, Cheap Threats, 57. 
15 Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces, 87. 
16 Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Bases Politics and American Globalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 209. 
17 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 210. 
7 
deterrence, but he maintains that the United States “need not reach out to transform 
others.”18  
Unilateral empire and imperial governance have proven unsustainable; however, 
the modern era of interdependence presents new opportunities for multilateralism and 
cooperation. Nuclear weapons, precision long range munitions, and the magnitude of 
interdependence have changed the character of war. Calder might not fully account for the 
strategic advantages that forward presence brings to alliance structure and security 
cooperation, deterrence and compellence factors that are enhanced by forward bases. A 
resilient, adaptable, well-balanced alliance structure is more sustainable than unipolar 
empire. 
C. FORWARD BASING IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA 
Japan is the most critical U.S. ally in Asia. The U.S. and Japan account for roughly 
30% of the world’s gross domestic product and over 40% of all world military 
expenditures.19 The U.S. maintains the largest forward permanent presence in Japan, 
stationed across roughly 130 bases, pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security of 1960.20 The military alliance is interoperable and conducts 
numerous cooperation exercises scaling from small unit training to Theater Level Exercises 
such as KEEN SWORD, EXERCISE MALABAR, Rim of the Pacific Exercise 
(RIMPAC), RESILIENT SHIELD, among many others.21 Active government-to-
government sales cases between the U.S. and Japan amount to over $20 billion; and in July 
2020, a $23.11 billion deal for an additional 105 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters became the 
 
18 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 210. 
19 Nan Tian et al., Trends in World Military Expenditures (Sweden: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2020) 2, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0_0.pdf. 
20 “Guidance from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan,” U.S. Forces, Japan, (September 13,2020), 
https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/. 
21 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan (Washington, DC: Department of 
State, 2020), https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/. David Brennan, “U.S., Japan 
Begin Joint Military Drills after China Enters Japanese Waters,” Newsweek, February 22, 2021. 
https://www.newsweek.com/us-japan-begin-joint-military-drills-china-enters-japanese-waters-1570892. 
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second largest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract on record.22 The Department of 
Defense (DOD) emphasizes that the U.S. forward presence and bases further demonstrate 
resolve to U.S. interests and ideals in the region and that the bases are symbols of strength 
and commitment to partners and allies for security in East Asia and beyond.23  
The largest concentration of active-duty U.S. military troops stationed overseas 
reside in Japan.24 As of 2016, Japan hosted 20% of the total number of U.S. active-duty 
military personnel permanently stationed overseas, or 38,818 servicemembers.25 As of 
2021, including rotational forces that deploy for months at a time, Japan hosts 
“approximately 54,000 military personnel, 45,000 dependents, 8,000 DOD civilian and 
contractors employees, and 25,000 Japanese workers.”26 The U.S. bases’ locations in 
Japan are shown in Figure 2. 
 
22 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan.; David Brennan, “U.S., Japan 
Begin Joint Military Drills after China Enters Japanese Waters,” Newsweek, February 22, 2021. 
https://www.newsweek.com/us-japan-begin-joint-military-drills-china-enters-japanese-waters-1570892. 
23 Catherine Lutz, The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (New York: 
New York University Press, 2009), 2–3.; Michael Green et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, 
Presence, and Partnerships, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016), 32–43. 
24 Kristen Bialik, “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas is at its Smallest in Decades,” Pew 
Research Center, last modified August 22, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-
active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades/.  
25 Bialik, “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas is at its Smallest in Decades.”  




Figure 2. U.S. Military Bases in Japan (2016).27  
Of the total number of active-duty personnel stationed in Japan, roughly 55%, or 
30,000 troops, maintain a constant presence on Okinawa.28 Okinawa prefecture represents 
0.6% of Japan’s total land mass and 1% of its total population, yet it hosts 32 bases that 
comprise 70.6% of all U.S. military facilities in Japan.29 The Okinawan bases’ locations 
are shown in Figure 3.  
 
27 Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan-White Paper 2016 (Tokyo, Japan: MOD, 
2016) https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_2-4-4_web.pdf 
28 Matthew M. Burke and Hana Kusumoto, “Okinawa Governor Calls for Dramatic Reduction of U.S. 
Military Footprint on the Island,” Stars and Stripes February 18, 2021. https://www.stripes.com/news/
pacific/okinawa-governor-calls-for-dramatic-reduction-of-us-military-footprint-on-the-island-1.662609 
29 Okinawa Prefectural Government, U.S. Military Base Issues in Okinawa (Washington, D.C: 
Okinawa Prefectural Government D.C. Office, 2020), https://dc-office.org/basedata 
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Figure 3. U.S. Military Bases and Facilities on Okinawa.30 
1. Background on U.S. Forward Basing in Okinawa 
Okinawan mobilized protests date back to the early 1950s, when society 
condemned war crimes perpetrated by Japanese soldiers during WWII. A heightened 
number of protests were observed in the mid-to-late 1950s as the mainland supported U.S. 
efforts during the Korean War. From the 1960s to 1970s, protests revolved around the 
U.S.’s operating out of Okinawa to support war efforts in Vietnam and against the Soviet 
 
30 Source: Dennis C. Blair and James R. Kendall, U.S. Bases in Okinawa: What Must Be Done, and 
Quickly, Sasakawa USA (Washington, DC: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2015), 2, https://spfusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/US-Bases-in-Okinawa.pdf 
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Union during the Cold War.31 One of the fundamental reasons for protest throughout the 
late 20th century was the contention that for the Japanese government to mandate Okinawan 
hosting of U.S. forces conducting operations violated Japan’s constitution, specifically 
Article 9, which “forever renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”32 
Scholars highlight that in the case of Okinawa, host-nation community protest 
demands strategic reevaluation of current U.S. force alignment.33 Foundational in 
Okinawans’ protest is the disproportionate footprint of U.S. forces in Okinawa relative to 
the mainland. The earliest accounts of Okinawan protest toward U.S. presence date to 1946, 
when U.S. forces expropriated private lands for forward bases after the Battle of Okinawa 
during WWII.34 Over the past few decades, protest has evolved to include issues pertaining 
to U.S. servicemember criminal activity, claims against violations of sovereignty, harmful 
impacts to the environment, nuisance and risks associated with military exercises, and anti-
war sentiments, among many others. The scale of protest has ranged from over 90,000 
citizens marching in 1996 to rally against the renewal of land leases for bases, to, more 
commonly, single individuals or small groups demonstrating at the gates of U.S. military 
bases.35 Three recent inflection points that impacted U.S. base strategy include a 1995 rape 
incident involving a 12-year-old girl and three convicted U.S. service members that 
resulted in the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), the 2002 
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) that served as the impetus for base consolidation 
 
31 Steve Rabson, “Okinawan Perspectives on Japan’s Imperial Institution,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 
6, no. 2 (February 1, 2008) https://apjjf.org/-Steve-Rabson/2667/article.html 




33 H.D.P. Enval and Kerri Ng, “The Okinawa “Effect” in US-Japan Alliance Politics,” Asian Security 
11, no. 3 (2015): 231–233; Akikazue Hashimoto, Takara Kurayoshi, and Mike Mochizuki, The Okinawa 
Question: Futenma, the United States Japan Alliance and Regional Security, (Washington, DC: The 
George Washington University, 2013); 1–12.  
34 Lutz, The Bases of Empire, 250. 
35 Martin Fackler, “90,000 Protest U.S. Base on Okinawa,” The New York Times, April 25, 2010, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26okinawa.html 
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and force realignment, and the 2010 resignation of the Japanese prime minister, Yukio 
Hatoyama, who claimed he stepped down due to his failure to reduce U.S. base presence.36  
The U.S.-Japan alliance and forward U.S. presence faced a particularly challenging 
inflection point upon the 1995 rape incident, whose consequences impact U.S.-Japan-
Okinawan relations to this day.37 Political pressure mounted after the commander of U.S. 
Pacific Command, Admiral Richard Macke, stated on November 17, 1995, “I think that 
[the rape] was absolutely stupid. For the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had 
a girl.”38 Admiral Macke was relieved of command shortly after. Around the same time, 
news reports alleged the Marine Corps’ public affairs officer in Okinawa stated, “it was 
just another rape.”39  
Protesters in Okinawa and some analysts say that the United States should reduce 
its presence because of the burden bases impose on host-nation communities. Moreover, 
they hold that the bases in Okinawa benefit U.S. and mainland Japan’s interests at the 
expense of Okinawan civil rights. In 1995, in response to the rape incident, then Okinawan 
governor Masahide Ota “challenged the central government’s land expropriation policy by 
refusing to approve a renewal of the government order to compel the provision of privately 
held land for U.S. military use.”40 Okinawan protesters asked, “Why does Okinawa 
continue to bear an excessive burden of hosting the majority of U.S. bases in Japan, and 
why does Okinawa continue to be treated like this?”41 
It is important that the narrative of U.S. base protest in Japan distinguish Okinawa 
from the mainland. From 1992 to 2017, approximately 77% of notable mobilized protests 
toward U.S. bases in Japan occurred in Okinawa. Moreover, it is important to recognize 
 
36 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 232. 
37 Robert D. Eldridge, “Remembering the Okinawa Rape Incident that Changed Japan-U.S. Military 
Relations,” The Japan Times, November 16, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/11/16/
commentary/japan-commentary/okinawa-rape-japan-us-military/. 
38 Eldridge, “Remembering the Okinawa Rape Incident that Changed Japan-U.S. Military Relations.” 
39 Eldridge, “Remembering the Okinawa Rape Incident that Changed Japan-U.S. Military Relations.” 
40 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 17.  
41 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 1–12.  
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that one base attracted by far the most protests. Figure 4 shows that Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Futenma observed not only 45% of the total number of protests on 
Okinawa, but also 35% of the total number of protests observed across all of Japan, making 
it by far the most protested U.S. base in Japan—and possibly worldwide.42  
 
Figure 4. Disparity of Major U.S. Base Protest Between Mainland 
Japan and Okinawa (1992-2017).43 
2. Background on U.S. Response to Okinawan Protest 
To address the public outcry over both the rape and fumbled responses from U.S. 
officials, the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was formed in 
November of 1995. While the servicemembers associated with the rape were stationed at 
 
42 Willis, “Incidents, Accidents, and Activists,” 4. 
43 Adapted from Willis, “Incidents, Accidents, and Activists,” 4. 
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Marine Corps Base Camp Hansen, approximately 20 miles north of the densely populated 
city of Ginowan, MCAS Futenma became the focal point for base reduction efforts.44  
Futenma was identified by SACO as the most suitable option for “reducing the 
impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa … while fully 
maintaining the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan.”45 MCAS Futenma 
spans approximately 1,200 acres in the middle of the densely populated Ginowan City, 
where 91% of the base is owned by 3,396 private Okinawan citizens who receive 
approximately $68 million annually in rent.46 Despite such significant compensation to 
local residents, some say Futenma has come to symbolize Okinawa’s general grievances 
toward mainland Japan. In 2019, the Governor of Okinawa, Denny Tamaki, stated that the 
failure to respond to Okinawan’s demands to eliminate Futenma is “disregard of the will 
of the people, the trampling of democracy, and the destruction of local government 
autonomy.”47  
Elevated levels of protest inspired demands for MCAS Futenma to be removed off 
Okinawa entirely. A May 2012 survey conducted by the newspapers Ryukyu Shimpo and 
Mainichi Shimbun found that 84.1% of Okinawans opposed MCAS Futenma’s relocation, 
a 17.1% increase from 2009.48 At a 2009 campaign rally in Okinawa, Yukio Hatoyama, 
the prime minister of Japan and a member of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), stated, 
“if everyone agrees on a relocation [of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma] out of the 
prefecture [we must] act assertively in that direction.”49 After receiving pressure from then 
U.S. President Obama in Tokyo in November 2009 to relocate the base within Okinawa, 
Hatoyama abandoned his policy to reduce U.S. presence. Hatoyama later resigned as Prime 
 
44 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 17.  
45 U.S. Department of State, SACO Final Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1996), 
https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-saco_final_961202.html. 
46 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question,” 36.  
47 Thisanka, Siripala, “Okinawa and Japanese Government Locked In Hostile Battle Over U.S. Base 
Relocation,” The Diplomat, December 21, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/okinawa-and-japanese-
government-locked-in-hostile-battle-over-us-base-relocation/. 
48 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 20. 
49 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 42. 
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Minister, claiming this was justified recourse for having failed to accomplish his campaign 
promise to reduce the U.S. base presence on Okinawa.50 It should be noted that in the 2006 
Okinawan gubernatorial election, Hirokazu Nakaima won with 52.3% of the vote running 
on economic development. His more “progressive” opponent had stressed a more 
aggressive plan for closing U.S. bases.51  
As of 2021, Futenma remains operational in the city of Ginowan, but a 2019 
referendum to entirely remove the base off Okinawa is the latest indication of the level of 
U.S. base protest. The referendum represented approximately 52% of Okinawans, 72% of 
whom voted against the relocation of MCAS Futenma, presumably supporting its removal 
entirely.52 Kazuhisa Ogawa, a Japanese military analyst present at the 1996 SACO 
agreement, says the relocation has not occurred for over twenty-four years “because of ill-
informed analysis and poor negotiation of the U.S.-Japan alliance.”53  
D. U.S. RESPONSE TO PROTEST: REALIGNMENT WITHIN OKINAWA 
AND TRANSFER TO GUAM  
Many scholars argue that the strategic importance of the bases requires they be 
maintained despite the protest, on the assumption that the protests are outweighed by the 
magnitude of strategic importance the forward bases provide to the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 
Armitage and Nye assert, “The alliance has spent far too much high-level attention over 
the past decade on the details of the disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa.”54 They 
maintain that protests have distracted Japan from the more pressing decision between 
complacency or “securing her status as a tier-one nation and her necessary role as an equal 
 
50 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 232. 
51 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 42. 
52 Matt Burke and Aya Ichihashi, “Okinawa Voters Say No to U.S. Base Relocation Plan in 
Prefecture-Wide Referendum,” Stars and Stripes, February 24, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/
pacific/okinawa-voters-say-no-to-us-base-relocation-plan-in-prefecture-wide-referendum-1.570234. 
53 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question,” 61.  
54 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The United States-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in 




partner in the alliance.”55 Furthermore, they suggest that the alliance’s force alignment 
should prioritize China’s emergent aggressiveness and North Korea’s persistent nuclear 
threats over protest exhibited by less than 1% of Japan’s population.56  
The United States has generally responded to Okinawan protest by reducing the 
number of bases or relocating them out of densely populated communities. In 1996, the 
SACO agreed to “return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after 
adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.”57 Political pressure from 
Okinawans advanced efforts to consolidate bases, relocate Marines off Okinawa, and to 
move the Futenma Air Station north to Camp Schwab—also known as the Futenma 
Replacement Facility (FRF). The concession to Okinawans’ protest “proved to be a huge 
turning point for Okinawan sentiments toward U.S. military bases.”58 However, significant 
terms in the SACO agreements were never met and timelines continued to be extended.  
The failures of SACO were the impetus for the 2002 joint U.S.-Japan Defense 
Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The objective remained, “to reduce the U.S. footprint in 
Okinawa, enhance interoperability and communication [with Japanese forces], and [to] 
better position U.S. forces to respond to a changing security environment.”59 The DPRI 
was revised in April 2012 and further specified that nearly 55% of the troops on Okinawa 
would be realigned off the island: 4,100 Marines would relocate from Okinawa to Guam 
by year 2026, 2,700 Marines to Hawaii by 2031, and 800 Marines to the continental United 
States. Marine officials stated that “the decision to relocate 800 Marines to the continental 
United States was made because there was a need to further reduce the Marine Corps’ 
presence on Okinawa.”60  
 
55 Armitage and Nye, The United States-Japan Alliance, 15. 
56 Armitage and Nye, The United States-Japan Alliance, 1–15. 
57 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 34.  
58 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 17.  
59 Lepore, Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment, 6. 
60 Lepore, Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment, 10. 
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Most of the realignment off Okinawa, specifically the 4,100 Marines, is a transfer 
of forces to Guam. It is planned for Guam to receive an additional 600 Marines from the 
continental United States. In total, Guam is planned to host approximately 5,000 Marines 
by 2028.61 
The Marine Corps has also modified its force structure to reduce force 
concentrations in East Asia. Infantry regiments operating in the Pacific are modifying force 
design to become Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR). MLRs are expected to reduce force 
presence in Okinawa. The MLR is comprised of approximately 2,000 Marines “task-
organized around an infantry battalion along with a long-range anti-ship missile battery.”62 
In July 2020, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, stated that the 
MLR would not increase the number of Marines hosted by Japan.63  
The DPRI, FRF, and reconfigured Marine Corps force design are substantial 
initiatives intended to reduce U.S. base protest, and thus enhance U.S.-Japan relations. 
With reduced protest, access is more likely to be maintained as political pressure is 
alleviated. Guamanians, also U.S. citizens, exhibit exceptionally higher levels of 
favorability towards the U.S. than observed in other parts of East Asia. Instances of protest 
in Guam have been minimal and have pertained to indigenous land rights, desires for 
federal voting rights, and environmental protectionism. The DOD realignment in East Asia 
is likely to reduce protest; however, the shift in forward posture presents other challenges 
to U.S. interests in the region.  
The remainder of the thesis will examine the significant drivers of protest that have 
pressured policymakers to reduce U.S. forward presence and assess the DPRI’s overall 
 
61 Todd South, “Marine Corps Plan to Relocate from Okinawa to Guam Needs a Review, 
Commandant Says,” Marine Corps Times, May 3, 2019, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-
marine-corps/2019/05/03/marine-corps-relocation-from-okinawa-to-guam-worthy-of-review-commandant-
says/. 
62 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Testing Regiment at Hear of Emerging Island-Hopping Future,” United 
States Naval Institute, June 4, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/04/marines-testing-regiment-at-heart-of-
emerging-island-hopping-future. 
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impact for decreasing protest in the region. The independent variables that influence protest 
are generally categorized into four groups: proximity, violation of sovereignty, democratic 
responsiveness, and external threat perception. Given the vital nature of forward bases to 
U.S.-Japanese interests, mitigating drivers of protest is critical to future access and military 
operations.  
In the following, Chapter 2 assesses the strength associated with each general driver 
of protest from general, Japan-, and Okinawa-specific perspectives. The findings indicate 
that the distance between the bases, specifically their operations and contact with 
servicemembers in relation to host nation population density, have significant influence on 
levels of protest. In general, factors associated with violation of sovereignty and democratic 
responsiveness recede as drivers of protest when bases were relocated out of densely 
populated areas. The evidence also suggests that as perception of external threat increases, 
so does favorability for U.S. bases. Chapter 3 examines which variables DPRI properly 
mitigates to reduce the potential for future base protest. Guam is unique among bases in 
East Asia because Guamanians are U.S. citizens; and, as such, perceive sovereignty issues 
as less of a factor. In Guam, the DPRI offsets most military operations from densely 
populated areas, and new military infrastructure is not expanding upon existing base 
property. The thesis concludes with a recommendation: that the U.S.-Japan alliance agree 
to a Host Nation Support Agreement that modifies Japanese basing policy to support 
multilateral operations in the region. 
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II. EXPLAINING PROTEST: JAPAN / OKINAWA / FUTENMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines U.S. base protest in Japan to evaluate hypotheses about the 
greatest drivers. Each driver of protest will be presented in general, regional, and then 
Okinawa-specific assessments. The chapter will conclude with Okinawa-specific 
implications that suggest that over time, protest is expected to decrease. The literature 
attaches statistical significance to explanatory factors involving U.S. base proximity, 
violation of sovereignty, democratic responsiveness, and external threat perception. Many 
of the independent variables covary with factors of proximity. Given that MCAS Futenma 
triggers the strongest measures among the general variables of protest, in relation to the 
bases examined, it is assessed that overall protest in Okinawa will decrease once the 
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) construction is complete. It is not likely that a similar 
level of protest will remain and transfer to another base. 
First, proximity tends to be the most significant driver for protest. The literature 
presents numerous viable case studies of base relocations and closures in both South Korea 
and Japan that effectively reduced protest. Historically, most issues of proximity revolved 
around exposure to the U.S. base operations and interactions with service members in host 
nation communities. Polling data depicts significant changes in U.S. favorability after base 
relocations and closures. This favorability was greater when bases were relocated out of 
more densely populated areas. This is particularly relevant to current efforts in Okinawa to 
relocate MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab. Futenma triggers more effects of proximity and 
observes more protest than any other U.S. base in Japan. U.S. basing strategies that mitigate 
factors of proximity while maintaining the necessary degree of access are critical to 
sustainable forward presence. The most influential factors of proximity must be viewed in 
relation to other variables to project how effective the DPRI will be at reducing overall 
U.S. base protest. 
Second, perceptions pertaining to the violation of sovereignty prove to be a 
significant protest platform. Generally, this involves two components: land rights and 
20 
jurisdiction over prosecution of U.S. servicemembers. Okinawa represents approximately 
0.6% of Japan’s total land mass and 1% of its total population, yet it hosts 32 bases that 
comprise 70.6% of all U.S. military facilities in Japan.64 Okinawa hosts the preponderance 
of U.S. servicemembers, but it faces certain constraints on its ability to prosecute criminal 
activity, as outlined in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).  
Third, Okinawans’ historical perceptions of democratic responsiveness associated 
with U.S. base policy is critical to the relationship between Okinawa and mainland Japan. 
Cooley and Hopkin argue that as Japan’s central government becomes more effective at 
responding to protest, U.S. base issues in Okinawa will become depoliticized over time.65 
The literature makes a cross-national observation that U.S. bases receive limited political 
attention when the majority’s views are effective at modifying U.S. base policy. Today in 
Okinawan politics, it is the norm is for political candidates to state a platform on U.S. base 
policy as they announce their candidacy. A competing explanation would be that mainland 
Japan is exercising authoritative measures on Okinawan democracy, and that the 
mainland’s lack of responsiveness detracts from its legitimacy in governing over Okinawa 
issues. Over the decades, the GOJ has responded to Okinawan protest with political 
overtures and concessions that have generally kept U.S. base policy out of federal-level 
politics.  
Lastly, external threat perception exhibits statistical significance in influencing 
levels of protest toward U.S. bases, and toward U.S. favorability in general. Simply stated, 
the more people fear outside threats against the country at large, the more they appreciate 
the presence of U.S. bases, and the less they protest (although, secondarily, some feel the 
bases increase the degree to their own communities in particular become targets for 
adversaries). In general, protest decreases when the nature of the U.S. presence becomes 
viewed less as transactional and oppressive and more as a partnered security effort against 
the external theat.  
 
64 Okinawa Prefectural Government, U.S. Military Base Issues in Okinawa.  
65 Cooley and Hopkin, “Base Closings,” 499. 
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B. DRIVERS OF PROTEST AND CASES 
This section will provide an in-depth examination of the four independent variables 
that best explain levels of protest toward U.S. bases abroad. Cases studies in Japan and 
South Korea are evaluated to assess cross-national and specific factors of proximity, 
violation of sovereignty, democratic responsiveness, and threat perception that contribute 
to protest.  
1. Proximity  
Existing research shows that base proximity to densely populated host-nation 
communities. covaries with many variables associated with exposure to military criminal 
activity and nuisance perception via cultural insensitivities and military exercises, and 
grievances over violation of sovereignty toward the U.S. and Tokyo.66 These factors seem 
to provide the most explanatory value over levels of protest in both Japan and South Korea, 
and particularly in Okinawa.  
Reduced protest, and improved levels of favorability toward the United States, were 
observed in South Korea when a large base was relocated south out of the capital of Seoul 
to a more rural region. South Koreans’ favorability toward the United States increased by 
over 15% after the base relocation and then held at about 80% favorability year after year.67 
This suggests level of protest in Okinawa should be reevaluated once the construction of 
Marine Corps’ Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and force realignment to Guam is 
complete. It should not be presumed that protest will subside after the completion of FRF 
construction without an accurate assessment of proximity and contact as factors. It would 
be prudent to assess the impacts of the FRF prior to implementing any further force 
realignment off Okinawa at the detriment of operational advantages. 
The distance between a given U.S. base and its host-nation community has a 
significant impact on many variables that drive protest. The closer bases are to densely 
populated areas, the more exposure citizens have to the burdens indicated by protesters. 
 
66 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 129–139, 166–175. 
67 Global Indicators Database, South Korea (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 
2020),https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/1/country/kr/ 
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Calder’s “Contact Hypothesis” examines proximity and argues it to be of significance in 
explaining cross- and intra-national variation in levels of protest: “In Japan, for example, 
opposition to U.S. bases is strongest in Kanagawa Prefecture, just south of Tokyo, which 
is one of Japan’s most urban jurisdictions, and in Okinawa, which is also densely 
populated.”68 Kagotani and Yanai identify evidence of stronger support for U.S. presence 
in Okinawan municipalities farther away from Marine Corps bases. Specifically, pro-base 
political platforms enjoyed more elevated support the farther away candidates campaigned 
from U.S. bases (specifically, from most populated base on Okinawa, Air Force Base 
Kadena).69  
Calder attributes this role for proximity to the fact that “American soldiers tend to 
be young, active, and often culturally insensitive, making it likely that personal contact 
with local citizenry will lead to conflict.”70 He further maintains that these sentiments hold 
even if the host country generally supports a U.S. presence. In Figure 5, Calder illustrates 
a strong relationship between base tensions and civilian-military population densities. 
 
68 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 86. 
69 Koji Kagotani and Yuki Yanai, “External Threats, U.S. Bases, and Prudent Voters in Okinawa,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 1 (January 2014): 104, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/
lct017. 
70 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 120. 
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Figure 5. Demonstrating the “Contact Hypothesis”: Evidence from 
within Key Nations.71 
a. Proximity Case in South Korea 
One important example illustrating the role of proximity is the reduction in protest 
observed after U.S. forces were relocated out of Seoul, South Korea in 2002 (Figure 6). In 
South Korea from 2008 to 2018, antibase sentiments reached their lowest historical levels 
after U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) relocated from Yongsan Garrison in downtown Seoul to 
Camp Humphreys, 40 miles south in Pyongtaek.72  
 
71 Source: Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 122. 
72 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 121–135. 
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Percent of South Korea responding Favorable, all years measured. 
Figure 6. South Korean’s Favorability Toward U.S. After 2002 Base 
Relocation73 
Allen et al., though, disagrees that proximity increases levels of protest. It presents 
evidence that increased contact, or “interactions,” is actually correlated with more 
favorable attitudes toward U.S. military personnel.74 It finds that “personal contact yields 
a larger coefficient in predicting positive attitudes”75 toward U.S. military presence. It was 
assessed that social capital and economic interest achieved soft power advantages that 
eventually reduced protest over time. A shared identity and culture materialized when 
service members and their dependents integrated within the host-nation community. As 
military members, in some cases, marry into the local community, children attend local 
schools, play sports, families become more involved in the community, friendships form, 
and culture is shared, which reduces prejudice and increases positive perceptions.76 
Moreover, Moon adds that support for U.S. bases increases when time of exposure between 
service members and host-nation civilians is increased. “Enduring contacts and interactions 
 
73 Source: Global Indicators Database, South Korea.  
74 Michael A. Allen, Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers, “Outside the 
Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Public Opinion in Host States,” American Political Science Review 
114, no. 2 (May, 2020) 326–339, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000868. 
75 Allen, Flynn, Machain, and Stravers, “Outside the Wire,” 335–337. 
76 Allen, Flynn, Machain, and Stravers, “Outside the Wire,” 328,  
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between U.S. military and local peoples in South Korea and Okinawa have been conducive 
to the production of ambivalence and postcolonial agency.”77 It is through increased 
interaction and exposure that Calder’s stereotype of the “young, active, and often culturally 
insensitive”78 service member becomes inaccurate.  
b. Proximity Case in Okinawa 
The contact hypothesis suggests that proximity covaries with exposure to U.S. 
service member criminal activity as an influence on levels of protest. According to 
numerous polls, the issue that prompts the most discontent among Okinawans is criminal 
activity alleged against military personnel. From 1972 to 1995, there were 12 cases of 
murder, 355 reported robberies, and 11 rape charges levied against U.S. military 
personnel.79 The event that created the greatest uproar and fomented political fervor for 
base closures was the 1995 rape of a 12-year-old girl by three U.S. military personnel.80 
From 1976 to 2009, the period between 1995 to 1997 observed one of the greatest levels 
of discontent toward U.S. military bases (Figure 7). The peak of unfavourability in Figure 
7 came in 2009. This was likely attributable to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) presenting U.S. basing issues at the front and center of its political agenda.  
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Figure 7. Okinawan Opinion regarding U.S. Military Bases on 
Okinawa.81 
This suggests that perceived U.S. servicemember criminal activity might be the 
strongest driver of Okinawans’ anti-base sentiment. It is worth mentioning that while 
“crime rates of U.S. forces in Okinawa remain well below that of the overall population,” 
this fact does not ease reactions to high-profile crimes perpetrated by servicemembers.82 
Hashimoto maintains that certain media outlets exploit antibase sentiments to exacerbate 
the perception that “disproportionately find United States Forces Japan (USFJ) military 
and civilian personnel and their dependents responsible for accidents and crimes.”83  
Another factor unique to Okinawa is that it hosts the largest contingent of forward 
deployed U.S. Marines in the world. Higher rates of crime, sexual assault, and vehicular 
accidents are consistently observed among U.S. youth between the ages of 17–24, and this 
age demographic is overrepresented in the Marine Corps compared to the other services.84 
 
81 Source: Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 18.  
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Approximately 70% of the Marine Corps’ enlisted force is 17 to 24 years old, compared to 
figures of 45% in the Army, 41% in the Navy, 40% in the Air Force, and 30% in the Coast 
Guard.85  
Related, Allen et al., which disputes proximity as a factor of increased protest, does 
not account for differences in rates of accidents, crime, or rotational presence associated 
with different types of U.S. forces when examining contact with host-nation 
communities.86 Per capita, U.S. forces on Okinawa are associated with higher crime rates 
and vehicular accidents than any other forces in Japan. For example, Okinawa hosts 
approximately 18,000 Marines—more than any other country in the world—and over 5,000 
of them deploy on a temporary rotational basis.87 The Marines on Okinawa represent 
roughly 55% of the total U.S. active-duty population on Okinawa. It is important to note 
that the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported that between 2004 and 2013, 9,962 
accidents and crimes were attributed to SOFA members – and while 48% of those occurred 
on Okinawa, U.S. forces in Okinawa only represented approximately 33% of the total 
number of forces under U.S. Forces Japan.88 Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS) 
reports that the Marine Corps, compared to the other service branches, tends to have a 
larger number of annually reported sexual assaults perpetrated by Marines against fellow 
servicemembers. In 2018, it had “an incidence rate of nearly 11%, followed by the Navy, 
7.5%; the Army, 5.8%; and the Air Force, 4.3%.”89 Such statistics are relevant when 
examining the type of contact U.S. bases have with the local community.  
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c. Proximity Case for MCAS Futenma 
Mochizuki contends that MCAS Futenma became the premier symbol for 
Okinawan protest as the population density surrounding the base increased.90 He argues 
that “because so many people reside and go about their daily activities in close proximity 
to this facility, many commentators have called Futenma Air Base one of the most 
dangerous military bases in the world.”91 When examining the heightened protest 
associated with MCAS Futenma, it is important to understand characteristics about the 
base: first, its location relative to Okinawan population density (Figures 8 and 9); and, 
second, the orientation of flight paths and frequency of operations over Okinawan 
population density (Figures 10 and 11). 
First, MCAS Futenma is in the middle of Ginowan city, which has a population of 
over 97,000 citizens. Figure 8 shows Futenma’s s large population density compared to 
other U.S. bases in Okinawa, at approximately 4,909 people per square kilometer.92 This 
is notable when compared to Kadena Air Force Base, which is significantly larger but only 
observed half the number of protests as Futenma from 1992 to 2017, and which is 
surrounded by an area with less than a third of Futenma’s population density.93 
Furthermore, Okinawans are significantly more exposed, both audibly and visually, 
to MCAS Futenma operations than to those of any other base in Okinawa. Annually, over 
23,000 aircraft landings and takeoffs occur throughout the day and night.94 The military 
aircraft involved are highly visible and noisy due to the relatively short size of the buildings 
that form Ginowan’s skyline. Figure 9 shows areas of the population and the decibel 
exposure associated with average daily aircraft operations; of note, 60 decibels are 
comparable to the noise level of normal conversation. 
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Figure 8. Okinawa Population Density Relative to Most Protested 
Bases.95 
 




Figure 9. CNEL Contours for Average Daily Aircraft Operations at 
MCAS Futenma (2012).96 
Second, Okinawans’ exposure to military operations is further intensified by the 
specific flight paths used in and out of MCAS Futenma (Figure 10). Futenma is 
approximately 5 miles from Okinawa’s capital city, Naha. Aircraft flight patterns for 
takeoff and landings bisect some of the most densely populated areas of Okinawa. Figure 
11 shows that over 35% of the annual air operations on Futenma are fixed-wing aircraft 
that have low-angle takeoffs and landings that exacerbate noise disruption. On the other 
hand, Kadena AFB is over 12 miles from Naha City Hall, and its aircraft flight paths are 
oriented into the East China Sea and into the rural Udonshiki Forest. Kadena AFB observes 
significantly fewer protests than MCAS Futenma; however, characteristics of Kadena 
significantly reduce host nation exposure to military operations. 
 
96 Source: United States Marine Corps Installations Command, Environmental Review for Basing MV-




Figure 10. Google Earth. Orientation of Kaden and Futenma Relative 
to Greatest Population Density.97 
 
97 Adapted from Google Earth, earth.google.com/web. 
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Figure 11. Flight Operations MCAS Futenma (2013) 98 
 
98 Source: United States Marine Corps Installations Command, Environmental Review for Basing MV-22 Aircraft at MCAS Futenma and Operating in 
Japan (Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2020), 2–21, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/osprey/haibi/pdf/env_review.pdf. 
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d. Proximity: Risks Associated with Exercises  
Another variable associated with proximity is the host communities’ increased 
exposure to the nuisance and risks associated with military exercises. Accidents associated 
with military exercise triggered grievances pertaining to sovereignty as well: these 
instances tended to be the tangible picture or event that was leveraged to justify protests.  
South Korean protesters have expressed similar concerns over aircraft and vehicle 
accidents. Kawato describes numerous cases in the 1990s and early 2000s in South Korea 
in which protest intensified after accidents associated with military exercises. In 2002, 
opposition to U.S. bases escalated when a U.S. military armored vehicle crashed on 
Highway 56 and killed two South Korean girls.99 
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma is where MV-22 Ospreys operate, and during 
the platform’s initial fielding in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was associated with 
several accidents that elevated protest across Okinawa. Accidents associated with MCAS 
Futenma presumably also tend to become front-page news more often because the risks are 
perceived to be elevated by the density of its surrounding city of Ginowan. In 2005, a CH-
53D crash landed on Okinawa International University and civil uproar demanded change 
to the current U.S. base layout.100 In 2016, when an Osprey crashed off the coast of 
Okinawa, protesters took to the streets and attempted to block the entrances to U.S. bases. 
While these crashes associated with MCAS Futenma spurred mobilized protest, 
similar accidents involving Kadena Air Force Base, which is not located within a densely 
populated city, prompted significantly less.101 In 2004, when two F-15s bumped each other 
off the south coast of Okinawa, protesters did not take to the streets (though a Kadena 
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Town assembly held a meeting with U.S. officials to submit a resolution calling for stricter 
safety measures to be implemented to prevent future accidents).102  
2. Violation of Sovereignty 
Two components of perceived violation of sovereignty tend to incite protest: land 
rights and jurisdiction to prosecute U.S. servicemembers. Okinawa is significantly smaller 
than mainland Japan but is tasked by the national government with hosting the vast 
majority of U.S. forces.103 Additionally, Okinawa faces certain legal restraints to prosecute 
criminal activity, as outlined in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The jurisdictional 
boundary between U.S. servicemembers and host nation communities is one factor that 
drives protest across Northeast Asia. 
a. Sovereignty Grievances in South Korea 
In South Korea, the United States in 2002 reduced the number of bases from 41 to 
23 through the Land Partnership Plan and relocated U.S. Forces Korea Headquarters, and 
the Army’s Second Infantry Division, from the densely populated capital of Seoul forty 
miles south to the rural area of Pyeongtaek. In 2005, roughly 12,000 protesters, to include 
Okinawans, demonstrated against the relocation to Pyeongtaek in favor of complete base 
closure.  
Criminal jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers alleged of crime is one of the most 
protested sovereignty issues in South Korea. In 2001, concessions were made in the Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that allowed service members to be transferred to the custody 
of Korean authorities if indicted. The revision to the SOFA was the result of “several well-
publicized crimes committed by USFK personnel against Koreans.”104 Protesters 
maintained that U.S. courts-martial proceedings had been too lenient on U.S. 
servicemembers, that justice was not being delivered to the Korean victims, and that South 
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Korea had jurisdiction over servicemembers in both off and on-duty status and should be 
able to detain suspects through the duration of the legal proceedings.105 This issue 
resurfaced after the previously mentioned Highway 56 incident in 2002, which spiked 
protest when the U.S. servicemembers fell under military jurisdiction and could not face 
civil trial.106 In the early 2000s, protests brought about new conditions in the SOFA 
agreement placing constraints on off-base military exercises and introducing more robust 
safety measures.107 
b. Sovereignty Grievance in Okinawa 
Fundamental in Okinawa’s platform of opposition toward Tokyo is the 
disproportionate representation of U.S. forces on Okinawa compared to the mainland. 
Smith notes that the disproportionate concentration dates to the 1969 Sato-Nixon 
communique that resulted from “popular opposition to U.S. forces [that] peaked during the 
Vietnam War.” The U.S. returned the Ryukyu Islands to Japan on the condition that the 
bases could remain.108 Smith adds, “The consequence was a consolidation and reduction 
of U.S. bases on the mainland Japanese islands while the U.S. military concentrated its 
forces in Okinawa Prefecture.”109 In May 1973, a poll administered by Asahi Shimbun, 
identified that 62% of surveyed respondents on Okinawa stated they were “disappointed” 
about reversion to Japan after their expectation for a reduction of U.S. bases failed to 
materialize.110  
The dominant complaint among Okinawan protesters is that approximately 75% of 
all U.S. forces in Japan are based in Okinawa rather than proportionally arrayed across 
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other Japanese prefectures.111 As of 2016, U.S. bases occupied approximately 15% of 
mainland Okinawa’s landmass.112 This fact contributes to protesters’ grievance that 
Okinawan sovereignty is worth less than citizens’ on the mainland. Protesters often hold 
that the concentration of bases represents an almost untouchable foreign power that 
maintains the privilege of separate jurisdiction. Calder classifies this group as “nationalistic 
protesters, who oppose bases primarily on cultural grounds, or due to the perceived 
violence they impose on national sovereignty.”113 Since the mid-1990s, the United States 
has undertaken significant efforts to acquiesce to grievances over violations of sovereignty 
by consolidating the number of bases and returning land to Okinawans. Dating back to 
1998, the United States has agreed to return 12,000 acres, or 21%, of the land it originally 
occupied on Okinawa (Figure 12).114 However, as of 2016 only 9,000 acres, or 17%, of 
the original acreage, had been returned.115 
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Figure 12. Land Planned for Return to Okinawa Under SACO.116 
A related component to violation of sovereignty pertains to Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFA). As recent as October 2018, newly-elected Okinawan Governor 
Denny Tamaki made public appeals to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to conduct a 
“fundamental review of Japan’s agreement with the Unites States on the status of U.S. 
forces.”117 He asserted that far too often Japanese police officials are denied access to U.S. 
bases to question suspects, and that Japanese authorities are restricted from conducting 
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investigations in cases in which U.S. military hardware was involved in accidents in 
pubic.118  
3. Democratic Responsiveness 
Existing cross-national literature also finds that levels of protest are significantly 
affected by the degree to which constituents feel government is responsive to their 
grievances.119 A popular protest platform in Okinawa is that the Japanese central 
government is represented by a “policymaking process that subjugates the interests of 
particular groups of citizens to the ‘national’ interest in security.”120 Mulgan contends that 
the Japanese central government subordinates Okinawan human and property rights to 
maintain provisions in the security treaty with the United States. She further holds that this 
effort is “aided and abetted by a nominally independent judiciary and in particular by a 
Supreme Court that has subordinated its rights of judicial review to a consistently 
conservative, pro-regime posture.”121 She points to the central government’s “legalistic 
and coercive” approach and the leveraging of compensation packages to address Okinawan 
protest as tactics typically utilized by authoritarian regimes.122  
Japan and South Korea are arguably among the most responsive democracies in 
Asia, as competitive democratic elections force strong parties to take a position when faced 
with substantial protest; and base restructuring and U.S. force realignments have been 
modified as a result. This logic suggests that if Japanese and South Korean national-level 
governments prioritize effective responses to U.S. base protest, grievances should diminish 
over time. The severe disparity in Okinawan and mainland political ideology and objectives 
are assessed further in the following section about Okinawa’s protest of U.S. bases.  
 
118 “Spotlight: New Okinawa Governor Urges Abe to Forego U.S. Base Move, Fundamentally 
Review SOFA,” Xinhua News Agency.  
119 Robert Weiner, “How can Democracy Matter?” (class notes for NS3620: Survey of Asian Politics, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2020). 
120 Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara, The Okinawa Question, 90. 
121 Aurelia George Mulgan, “Managing the U.S. Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese 
Democracy,” Japanese Studies 20, no. 2 (August 4, 2010) 159. doi:10.1080/713683781 
122 Mulgan, “Managing the U.S. Base Issue in Okinawa,” 159–160. 
39 
Pettyjohn and Kavanagh support Cooley and Calder’s arguments about the variable 
of democratic responsiveness (Figure 13). When measuring Okinawa’s democratic 
responsiveness, it is worth remembering authoritarian regimes, comparatively speaking, 
are perhaps more appropriately classifiable as ones that tend to make basing agreements 
that “lack popular legitimacy.”  
 
Figure 13. Basing Agreements and Regime Type.123 
States that function at higher levels of democratic responsiveness are characterized 
by “stable institutions, and a well-developed party system—that together help depoliticize 
the issue of U.S. bases.”124 Historical instances of democratic transition, particularly in 
Asia, have exhibited heightened contention over U.S. basing issues as political 
entrepreneurs exploited such sentiments in political competition.125 At the national level 
in Japan, U.S. bases draw relatively limited political attention. U.S. basing issues tend to 
gain prominence in smaller localities, such as Okinawa.  
 
123 Source: Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Jennifer Kavanagh, Access Granted: Political Challenges to U.S. 
Overseas Military Presence, 1945–2014, RR1339 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 42. 
124 Pettyjohn, and Kavanagh, Access Granted, 44–45. 
125 Cooley and Hopkin, “Base Closings,” 499. 
40 
Historically in Asia, less democratic governments have tended to offer U.S. access 
in exchange for monetary benefits that enhance regime survival.126 Cooley and Hopkin 
quantitatively demonstrate that “checks and balances, and independent judiciary, and 
diverse media are all likely to reduce the scope for nationalist appeals [apparent in periods 
of democratic transition] as they increase stability across different policy domains.”127 
More responsive democracies have overlapping authorities that balance power and hold 
officials accountable to protests held by the majority. Additionally, in responsive 
democracies voters have multiple avenues to pursue conflict resolution rather than 
resorting to protest.  
a. Democratic Responsiveness: Okinawa’s Grievances Toward Tokyo 
According to the literature, democracy in Okinawa is not contested; however, the 
U.S. alliance with Japan is likely to become more strategically strained if the Japanese 
central government is perceived as unresponsive to Okinawan protest. If Okinawans 
perceive that their interests are becoming further divergent from the mainland, or that 
majority interests lack the power to effect change, this could strain local-national relations. 
It could further escalate to the point of straining U.S.-Japanese relations.  
A recent example of unresponsiveness from Tokyo occurred in 2019, when then- 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that plans to relocate Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma would proceed despite referendum results in Okinawa against the measure. The 
2019 poll, which captured 52% of the Okinawan population, showed that 72% opposed the 
relocation and 19% favored it.128 While a significant contingent opposed the relocation of 
the base, the poll did not represent the majority of Okinawa.  
A 2017 Congressional Research Service report notes that “the attitudes of native 
Okinawans towards U.S. military bases are generally characterized as negative, reflecting 
a tumultuous history and complex relationships with ‘mainland’ Japan and with the United 
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States.”129 Gintautas asserts that the Japanese government’s failure to address the Okinawa 
issue “has led to a dangerous dearth of public support at the popular, grassroots level as 
seen by the successive elections of anti-base governors and in almost every public base-
related referendum held in the last decade.”130 Stewart not only supports this assertion but 
also states further that “according to several experts, Japan’s main security concern is the 
possibility of Okinawa declaring independence, in part due to its grievances against Tokyo 
and Washington.”131 The anti-base issue in Okinawa is so prominent that it eclipses any 
other topics in local elections. As one University of Ryukyus law student noted, “this 
phenomenon exists because voters are so much more easily moved by a politician’s stance 
toward the U.S. military than their stance on local funding for a new school.”132 
b. Compensation Politics 
The GOJ’s tendency to respond to Okinawan protest with political compensation 
has proven effective at moderating protest, but not at addressing core issues. The GOJ 
utilizes various branches within the Ministry of Defense to address Okinawans’ grievances 
toward U.S. bases; the principle means for resolving issues is pork barrel incentives and 
cash settlements.133 In 2006, the budget for handling such grievances totaled over $5 
billion, which comprised approximately 11% of Japan’s total defense budget.134 In 2018, 
the GOJ paid approximately $3.28 billion in compensation to Okinawans who claimed to 
be negatively impacted by U.S. bases.135  
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Agencies within the Ministry of Defense are responsible for allocating funds and 
resources to Okinawans who file claims against injuries, accidents, noise pollution, and 
criminal activity perpetrated by U.S. personnel. There are approximately thirty-six offices 
across Japan that are responsible for serving as the liaison between citizen grievances and 
the U.S. military. These offices are “endowed with unique structures, networks, and 
organizational goals conducive to politically efficient compensation politics.”136 The 
liaison offices serve a critical role in civil-military relations and effectively utilize 
compensation tools to ease protest against U.S. bases. Some allege the compensation 
packages are tools to apply “economic incentives and coercive legal measures [to] 
undermine antibase pressure.”137 Financial support has proven to be an effective means 
for coopting victims of crime. Calder asserts that such tactics tend to be employed more 
often in authoritarian regimes or less responsive democracies.138 In 2019, a Japanese high 
court ordered 26.1 billion yen (242.36 million U.S. dollars) to be paid by the Japanese 
government to approximately 22,000 Okinawan plaintiffs over aircraft noise from U.S. 
bases.139  
4. Threat Perception 
The literature also finds that higher external threat perception tends to reduce 
protest. Pettyjohn and Kavanagh find that U.S. base favorability grows elevated during 
instances of heightened external threats (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14. Character of U.S. Base Access in Relation to External 
Threat.140 
Pettyjohn and Kavanagh suggest the type of relationship the United States has with 
the host-nation is critical in explaining levels of base support. They find that when the 
relationship is transactional, protest increases, since interests are less aligned. Elevated 
support for bases exists when the U.S. presence supports host-nation interests and when tis 
missions against external threats are viewed as legitimate.141 However, host nations tend 
to challenge U.S. access when they fear becoming implicated in conflicts that diverge from 
their national interests.142  
After World War II, amid the looming threat of communism, the United States 
faced limited protest with respect to military access in Japan and South Korea. However, 
access was challenged and protest increased after the Cold War.143 Some scholars note 
that politicians can more easily justify the presence of U.S. bases when discussing 
significant external security threats, but, at the same time, that it is challenging to assess 
the population’s perceived threat level.144 In general, it is presumed that Okinawan support 
increases during instances of North Korean provocation and Chinese aggression.  
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Kagotani and Yanai find that “external threats do encourage Okinawans to support 
pro-base candidates.” 145 They present regression analysis demonstrating that for every 
“one-point increase in Japanese risk perception of war, the vote share of pro-base 
candidates increases by .37 points.”146 Or, for every 10% of respondents who perceive a 
risk for war, a pro-base candidate would receive approximately a 3.7-point increase.  
Some in Okinawa also feel made into a target at the same time, though. In March 
2013, North Korea threatened to strike U.S. bases in Okinawa after American B-52s 
bombers were said to be conducting military drills out of Kadena Air Force Base on 
Okinawa. The North Korean Central News Agency published a statement reminding the 
U.S. that Okinawa is “within the range of our precision target assets.”147 Protesters have 
expressed concern that U.S. military presence and operations draw Okinawans into U.S. 
conflicts. When asked during a 2017 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) news segment if 
she felt safer with U.S. forces in Okinawa, one respondent replied, “Less safe. It means we 
became a target.”148  
C. OKINAWA SPECIFIC FACTORS OF U.S. BASE PROTEST 
This section presents main drivers behind a higher level of mobilized protest in 
Okinawa compared to mainland Japan. To explain the disparity between Okinawa and 
mainland Japan’s levels of mobilized base protest, Willis utilized Poisson and negative 
binomial regressions to examine “the number of protests per base over the 26-year period 
from 1992 to 2017.”149 “Protests” was identified utilizing news articles catalogued by 
LexisNexis. “For every news article that mentioned a discrete protest, a ‘1’ was recorded 
for the corresponding base.”150 Independent variables included distance from China, 
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number of military personnel permanently stationed at the U.S. base, base-related 
incidents, base proximity, and per capita income (PCI).151 In the model that exhibited the 
best relationship explaining the frequency for mobilized protest, independent variables that 
showed the highest degree of statistical significance included the number of military 
personnel permanently stationed at the U.S. base and the number of incidents associated 
with a base (Figure 15). Willis concludes that “high numbers of military personnel and 
high numbers of base-related incidents are associated with a greater anti-US base protest 
frequency.”152 
 
Figure 15. Poisson and Negative Binomial Regressions of Japanese 
Antibase Protests.153 
Although Okinawa has high-intensity versions of many of the types of factors 
Willis describes, it also has certain protest drivers that are unique. These models fail to 
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capture the influences associated with the number of service members permanently 
stationed at a U.S. base in relation to the proximity of the base to a densely populated 
community. For example, Kadena Air Force Base maintains a population of over 20,000 
servicemembers compared to MACS Futenma’s 4,000, yet Kadena observed 42% fewer 
protests than MCAS Futenma.154 This suggests there are unique characteristics about 
MCAS Futenma that inspires increased protest. 
1. Normalization of Protest in Okinawa 
Anti-base discourse has normalized in Okinawan culture—manifested by a 70-year 
history of protest.155 The director of the Peace Philosophy Centre holds that Okinawan’s 
activism for protest “comes from centuries of colonization, oppression and abuse. It’s a 
relatively small community and has a strong sense of national/ethnic identity. Many protest 
efforts come from Okinawa’s long-standing situation of being isolated and abandoned by 
much of the Japanese mainland media.”156 
On mainland Japan, the act of protesting is viewed to be less socially acceptable 
and the central government is more active in its efforts to prevent protests. Demonstrators 
face authoritative pressure and legal repercussions under the guise of threatening state 
security; “the nail that sticks out (by protesting) will be hammered down.”157 “[Mainland] 
Japanese have a weakness against the establishment, authority and the bureaucracy.”158 In 
2013, Japan passed a “state secrets law” that gives police wider jurisdiction for cracking 
down on civil disturbances. On the mainland, protesters often “don white flu masks and 
pull down their hats to make it harder for the police filming the protests to identify 
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them.”159 Many Japanese fear the new law will intimidate activists and inhibit them from 
participating in civil discourse against the central government.160 
Okinawans appear to be less deterred by the new state secrets law. In Okinawa, 
central-government prosecutors announced in November 2017 that they were “seeking a 
prison sentence of two and a half years of hard labor for prominent anti-base protester and 
chairman of Okinawa Peace Activity Center, Hiroji Yamashiro.”161 After his arrest on 
November 26, approximately 3,000 protestors organized a sit-in outside of Marine Corps 
Base Schwab, where construction is underway for the relocation of MCAS Futenma. When 
evaluating the level of U.S. base protest in Japan, the difference in protest culture between 
the mainland and Okinawa must be considered. 
2. Okinawa’s Ethnocultural Identity of Oppression by Tokyo  
Okinawans commonly accept a historical narrative of a “tumultuous” relationship 
with Tokyo which has coalesced into a normalized political identity. Flint notes that that 
identity has evolved into a principal “tool for political gain” in Okinawan local politics.162 
Political entrepreneurs have gone further to exploit this expressed divergence with the 
mainland as an ethnic cleavage. Many Okinawans identify first as Okinawan, then as 
Japanese.163 Antibase sentiments could be an underlying unifier and symbol of 
ethnocentric politics and grievances toward Tokyo. 
Okinawa’s tumultuous history with the mainland spans 500 years, covering the 
1609 Satsuma Invasion, the 1879 annexation of the Ryukyu Islands by the mainland, 
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oppression during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, and the 1945 United States occupation 
supported by the mainland.164 Flint notes, “Okinawan identity [has] become integral to 
anti-base discourse.”165 Willis further adds that “there is more solidarity between 
Okinawans regardless of their perspective on the bases than between Okinawans and 
mainland Japanese with the same view of the bases.”166 
3. Identity Politics and MCAS Futenma 
MCAS Futenma has become a core symbol of Okinawans’ identity of protest and 
grievances toward Tokyo. It is likely that its relocation would cause a substantial shift in 
political capital favoring the LDP and the GOJ. Okinawan politicians have campaigned on 
the sensitivities associated with U.S. bases and what they represent, emphasizing messages 
of “identity over ideology.”167 A political concession to Okinawans by the GOJ would 
diminish the shared perception that Okinawa’s position is inferior to the mainland’s 
political objectives.168 The question is whether the resulting shift in domestic political 
capital would be proportional to the decline in the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In 
2009, Okinawans expressed high expectations that the central government would “finally 
promote Okinawa’s interests vis a vis the United States,” when Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama pledged to relocate MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa.169 However, “Japan’s 
top security policy officials undermined Hatoyama by advising their U.S. counterparts to 
stand firm” against the relocation, and Hatoyama claims this failure to overturn the 
Japanese bureaucracy was the cause for his resignation June 2010.170 To this day, over 
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thirty years later, MCAS Futenma remains located in Ginowan and represents the most 
significant political impasse between Okinawa and the Government of Japan. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There is a growing concern among U.S. and Japanese security strategists that U.S. 
base protest will continue to contribute to the political impasse between Okinawa and the 
mainland; however, findings suggest that the status quo is likely to persist for the 
foreseeable future.171 If the DPRI maintains progress, Okinawans continue to be 
compensated for their burden share of U.S. bases, and external threat perception increases, 
protest in Okinawa could presumably decrease overtime. Grievances rooted in history and 
codified by an Okinawan perception of superiority held by the mainland have advanced 
antibase sentiments and Tokyo has responded with more subsidies and heightened effort 
to reduce U.S. presence. The 1995 rape incident propelled diplomatic efforts to reduce the 
burden on Okinawans and MCAS Futenma came to symbolize the “core” of Okinawan 
grievances toward Tokyo. Characteristics of Futenma such as proximity, heightened 
exposure to military operations, and its identity as a political symbol contribute to its 
exceptionally high level of protest. Compensation politics lack long term viability; 
however, current efforts to relocate Futenma and the decline of a cohort with experiences 
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III. U.S. RESPONSE TO OKINAWA PROTEST: DEFENSE 
POLICY REVIEW INITIATIVE (DPRI) AND BASING IN GUAM 
The Department is modernizing its force posture in Guam, in keeping with 
Guam’s position as the westernmost territory of the United States and a 
strategic hub for our joint military presence in the region. We are 
establishing a Marine Air Ground Task Force of 5,000 U.S. Marines in 
Guam starting in the first half of the 2020s as a central feature of the U.S.-
Japan realignment plan. 
—The Department of Defense 172 
This chapter examines the U.S.-Japan allied response to the protest in Okinawa, as 
outlined in the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The Marine Corps plans to realign 
approximately 55% of its forces in Japan to Guam, Australia, and Hawaii as a direct result 
of pressure from U.S. base protest in Okinawa. The transfer of Marines could begin as early 
as October 2024 and is projected to be completed by 2031.173 This chapter will examine 
the DPRI’s realignment of Marines to Guam based on the explanatory factors for protest 
identified in Okinawa, specifically with regard to proximity, base characteristics, 
imposition on sovereignty, and grievances toward the U.S. government. In addition, this 
chapter will identify potential drivers for future protest, such as the social impact of 
additional Marines, increased awareness of environmental impacts of base operations, and 
Guamanians’ desire for federal voting rights. Much of Guam’s antibase protest is driven 
by grievances associated with ethnic and national self-determination efforts that manifest 
in demands for land rights. Land currently part of Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) is where 
construction is underway for the new Marine Corps headquarters. Because Andersen AFB 
represents the largest majority of the current basing presence, it will be utilized as a proxy 
to establish the baseline and prospects for protest in Guam. Additionally, this chapter will 
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evaluate the extent to which the DPRI will likely resolve in Guam the identified drivers of 
U.S. base protest in East Asia. The level of base protest in Guam is not likely to reach that 
observed in Okinawa. However, social impacts brought by additional Marines (which will 
almost double the number of total U.S. forces on Guam), growing awareness of the 
environmental impacts of the military, and Guamanians’ desire for federal voting rights 
will require attention to ensure protest does not disrupt base policy. 
A. CURRENT STATUS OF DPRI 
The U.S. and Japanese government believe the future strength of the alliance is 
contingent on reducing the pressures associated with U.S. base protest on Okinawa; this 
strategy is outlined in the DPRI. Figure 16 exhibits DPRI’s plan for the Marine Corps’ 
realignment in the Pacific and land plots planned for return to Okinawans. The number of 
rotational and permanently stationed Marines on Okinawa is planned to decrease from 
29,600 to 11,500, and roughly 4,100 Marines and 1,300 dependents will relocate to Guam 
by FY 2028.174 Additionally, 2,700 Marines are slated to relocate to Hawaii, 1,300 to 
Australia, and 800 to the continental U.S.175 The reduction of Marines in Okinawa is 
accompanied by plans to return approximately two-thirds of the roughly 390,000 acres of 
land currently occupied for Marine bases back to their original Okinawan land owners.176 
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Figure 16. DPRI Marine Realignment (left); Base Consolidation 
(right).177 
On September 2020, the Marine Corps activated Camp Blaz, Guam, to receive 
approximately 5,000 Marines by 2028 from III MEF in Okinawa.178 The Camp is located 
at the Northwest Field on Andersen AFB, as shown in Figure 17. The base was named for 
Brigadier General Vicente “Ben” Tomas Garrido Blaz, the highest-ranking Chamorro to 
have ever served in the Marines and a former congressman for Guam.179 On February 11, 
2020, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Pacific awarded a $204 
million contract, paid for by Japan, to build two bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ) 
complexes at Camp Blaz, expected to be completed by September 2023.180 The timeline 
for transition “expects Marines to begin arriving in Guam by 2024, with 2,500 there by 
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2026 and the full 5,000-Marine force to be in place by 2028.”181 Only 1,300 Marines are 
expected to be permanently stationed on Guam, with an additional 3,700 deploying from 
the Continental United States on a rotational basis—similar to the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force pattern of deployment to Australia’s Northern Territory in Darwin.182 Family 
members of those Marines permanently stationed on Guam are to live at Andersen AFB, 
where construction is underway for an additional 300 houses to compliment the bases’ 
residential area.183 As of September 2020, “the Japanese government is funding $3 billion 
worth of projects for the Marines’ relocation, with the U.S. government spending another 
$5.7 billion.”184  
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Figure 17. Locations of Guam’s Force Structure Increase.185 
B. BACKGROUND OF U.S. BASES ON GUAM AND INCIDENTS OF 
PROTEST 
Guam is the westernmost U.S. territory, approximately five times smaller than 
Rhode Island, and about 28% of its landmass is occupied by the U.S. military. As of 2017, 
Guam was home to 159,358 residents, of whom 5,374 were military personnel and 6,470 
were servicemembers’ dependents.186 The U.S. military, tourism, and construction are the 
Guam’s top three industries; and, as of 2018, base construction projects were the largest 
contributor to private sector growth within the construction industry.187 Guam’s citizenry 
is multi-ethnic and multi-racial, and Chamorros, whose claims to Guamanian ancestry 
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stretch back 4,000 years, make up the largest group, at about 37%.188 Filipinos are the 
second largest ethnic group, at 26%; other Pacific Islanders comprise 11%, and Whites 
represent 7%.189 
Guam became a U.S. colony through a bloodless defeat of the Spanish in 1898. The 
island was seized by the Japanese during WWII on December 10, 1941, and remained 
under Japanese occupation to support war efforts until the U.S. “liberated” Guam on July 
21, 1944.190 Liberation Day is celebrated annually on Guam with a parade to honor the 
U.S. military on Marine Drive, one of the busiest streets in Guam.191 However, 
independence from U.S. Naval administrative control was not gained until considerable 
protest convinced President Harry S. Truman to intervene and grant independence in 
1950.192 Protests had centered around a “crusade against colonialism,” and demands for 
independence as a reward for “courageous opposition to the Japanese occupation.”193 To 
this day, Guam remains a self-governed U.S. territory whose officials lack federal voting 
power. 
Rogers argues that once liberated from the Japanese, Guamanians remained 
relatively “passive in regard to political status in the years from 1950s into the 1960s.”194 
He argues that U.S. base protests began to arise in the 1970s over the land used by U.S. 
 
188 Jon Letman, “Guam: Where the U.S. Military is Revered and Reviled,” The Diplomat, August 29, 
2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/guam-where-the-us-military-is-revered-and-reviled/ 
189 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Overview of the State – Guam 2020, (Rockville, 
MD: HRSA, 2021), https://mchb.tvisdata.hrsa.gov/Narratives/Overview/27e602c4-2c10-46fb-8300-
4d3a17ba5fe4#:~:text=The%20March%202018%20Guam%20Labor,willing%20and%20available%20to%
20work. 
190 “Invasion of Guam: July 21-August 10, 1944,” National Museum of the U.S. Navy, April 8, 2021, 
https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/wwii/wwii-pacific/
mariana-islands/guam.html 
191 Letman, “Proposed U.S. Military Buildup on Guam Angers Locals Who liken it to Colonization,” 
The Guardian, August 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/01/guam-us-military-
marines-deployment. 
192 Timothy P. Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” Pacific Historical Review 
53, no. 1 (February 1984) 59. 
193 Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” 59–60. 
194 Robert F. Rogers, “Guam’s’ Quest for Political Identity,” Pacific Studies 12, no. 1 (November 1, 
1988) 52. 
57 
military to support operations in Vietnam.195 After the Vietnam War, in 1975, the U.S. 
granted commonwealth status, or the right to self-government, to Guam’s neighboring 
islands Northern Mariana Islands (NMI).196 This act triggered “the political status issue 
[and] rekindled Chamorro consciousness and gave it a cause.”197 To this day, Guam is not 
a free commonwealth and its official political status remains “unincorporated territory of 
the United States.”198 
A small group of young Chamorro activists who had been educated in American 
universities after WWII organized and petitioned the United Nations for self-determination 
in Guam.199 As in Okinawa, activism for sovereign land rights began to coalesce around 
U.S. military basing. Since the establishment of Andersen AFB in 1945, protests directed 
at the base have generally been limited in number and characterized by small gatherings. 
Even during the Vietnam War, one of the periods when anti-U.S. base sentiment was 
highest in East Asia, the Lieutenant Governor of Guam claimed that the majority of 
Guamanians supported military buildup on the island because of the prospect of economic 
opportunity.200 The examples below represent instances of significant protests associated 
with Andersen AFB: 
• The earliest identified protest of significance occurred in July 21–29 1992, 
when future Senator Angel Santos and the Nasion Chamouru Activist 
Group protested at Potts Junction at the entrance of the Northwest Field of 
Andersen AFB and NAS Agana.201 One of the most significant periods of 
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civil rights protests on Guam was from 1992 to 1993 and centered around 
the U.S. military presence.202 This was after military presence on Guam 
increased to support the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion into Kuwait.203  
• In October 2011, the Taotaomona Native Rights group, who represent 
ethnic Chamorros, protested at the gate of Andersen AFB over the DOD’s 
decision to “shift some U.S. Marine Corps’ jet fighter training from 
Okinawa to the U.S. territory.” We Are Guahan, another Guamanian 
activist group, sued the DOD over construction occurring on archeological 
sites that contained ancestral Chamorro graves.204 
• On September 23, 2017, roughly a dozen protesters assembled at the front 
gate to Andersen AFB to protest planned construction for the firing range 
at Northwest Field Live Fire Training Range Complex. During the 
demonstration, one protester, Harold Cruz, was arrested.205 Cruz 
proclaimed he had been arrested eight times in the past while alongside the 
late Senator Angel Santos, an iconic Chamorro activist and protest 
leader.206  
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• On July 11, 2019, over 50 protesters demonstrated at Chief Quipuha Park 
in Hagatna to protest new base construction at the Northwest Field firing 
ranges at Andersen AFB.207 
C. OKINAWA AND GUAM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES 
THAT DRIVE U.S. BASE PROTEST  
The DPRI is a U.S.-Japan joint effort to reduce U.S. base protest in Okinawa; 
however, cross-national independent variables that influence such protests can provide 
insight into the likelihood it will impact levels of base protest in Guam. Given what was 
identified in Okinawa, prospects for future protest on Guam can be assessed by evaluating 
how the DPRI has deal with base proximity and physical characteristics, impositions on 
sovereignty, and levels of grievance or local support.  
1. Proximity  
The Okinawan case illustrates that one of the most significant drivers of U.S. base 
protest is base proximity to population-dense areas. Factors known to contribute to 
proximity’s effects included heightened exposure to military operations and to 
servicemember accidents and crime. Compared to MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, and to 
MCAS Iwakuni, MCAS Atsugi, Fleet Activities Sasebo and Yokosuka on mainland Japan, 
U.S. base locations in Guam are relatively distant from regions with the highest population 
density (Figure 18). Another contributing factor is Guam’s significantly smaller population 
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Figure 18. Proximity of U.S. Bases Relative to Guam Population 
Density.209 
a. Exposure to Military Operational 
Although plans call for a static multipurpose machine-gun range to be built on the 
northwest corner of Camp Blaz, the DPRI has taken considerable measures to reduce 
civilian exposure to military operations by offsetting maneuver exercises to the 
significantly less inhabited islands of Tinian (population 3,136) and Pagan (population 0), 
represented in Figure 19.210  
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Figure 19. Locations of Marine Realignment to Guam, Tinian, and 
Pagan.211 
On Okinawa, one main issue associated with exposure to military operations has 
been aircraft accidents. Okinawans have been concerned about aircraft accidents occurring 
in the densely populated village of Ginowan. However, on Guam, Marine aviation will 
operate out of Andersen Air Force Base, which is located approximately 8 miles northeast 
from the most densely populated town of Tamuning. This aviation offset significantly 
mitigates risks associated with operational accidents and noise pollution imposed on 
citizens. Construction for a new Marine aircraft hangar on Andersen AFB is expected to 
be complete by spring of 2021.212 Furthermore, aviation flight paths are oriented toward 
the Pacific Ocean rather than bisecting densely populated areas such MCAS Futenma in 
Ginowan, Okinawa. 
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The U.S. Navy Commander of Joint Region Marianas, Rear Admiral Shoshana S. 
Chatfield, testified in 2017 to then Senator of Guam, the Honorable Telena C. Nelson, that 
the Department of the Navy had taken significant measures to maximize the distance 
between operational noise and the civilian population. The more complex ground force 
maneuver training, or non-static live-fire exercises, are to take place on the separate islands 
of Tinian and Pagan. Moreover, Marine aviation operations will occur on the already 
existing Andersen Air Force Base that is offset from the most densely populated city 
Tamuning. Current plans for live-fire training on Guam mostly consists of small arms that 
will take place at the Northwest Live Fire Training Complex, 10 miles north of Tamuning. 
Admiral Chatfield asserted “most noise for those outside of the safety buffer during range 
operation to hear noise no louder than a normal conversation.”213 
b. Exposure to Servicemember Accidents and Crime 
While the DPRI has reduced the factor of exposure to larger military exercises, 
which was a significant driver of base protest in Okinawa, it is less apparent how the 
initiative plans to address the social impact brought by the influx of Marines. Many 
scholars accept that high profile negative events such as vehicular accidents and crime tend 
to sway public opinion about military bases.214 Characteristic unique to Marines, 
compared to the other U.S. services, should be factored when making inferences about 
future protest associated with the realignment to Guam.  
As noted above, the total number of vehicular accidents and crime rates associated 
with forces on Okinawa, predominantly Marines, has been the highest among all U.S. 
Forces stationed in Japan.215 This was largely attributed to the Marine Corps’ 
overrepresentation younger servicemembers, who tend to be associated with higher rates 
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of crime, sexual assault and vehicular accidents.216 Guam, similar to Okinawa, tends to 
observe significantly lower crimes rate than those in the United States.217 A high-profile 
crime committed by a Marine on Guam would likely increase incidents of significant 
protest, such as the one observed on July 3, 2020, when approximately seventy 
Guamanians organized outside Andersen AFB to protest construction under way for the 
U.S. Marine Corps Base, Camp Blaz.218 
Chapter 2 also noted that rotational servicemembers, as opposed to permanently 
stationed personnel, are associated with higher crime rates: “In aggregate, the mere 
presence of troops does not increase the criminal activity in a state; however, […] the 
presence of foreign deployed troops is associated with higher levels of property-related 
crimes in a country.”219 As of 2020, the DPRI plans for 1,300 of the total 5,000 Marines 
on Guam to station permanently, while the other 3,700 will deploy to Guam on a rotational 
basis.220 It can be inferred that the rotational nature of these forces, and the lack of the 
social embeddedness that tends to follow longer exposure between forces and the host-
nation society, will have a social impact on Guam’s society. Marine base policy for 
rotational forces in Guam should mitigate the discussed drivers of societal resistance to 
U.S. military presence on Okinawa. 
Some Guamanians have already expressed opposition to the social dynamic 
imposed by the relocation of the Marines to Guam. Natividad asks, “Why is the 
government of Japan willing to pay so much money to transfer Marines from Okinawa to 
Guam?”221 She underscores the long history of sexual violence perpetrated by U.S. 
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Marines on Okinawans. Vivian Dames, host of a Guam Public Radio program, has stated, 
“The thing is, it’s not reducing the burden, it’s simply shifting it somewhere else—in this 
case to Guam.”222 
An additional 5,000 Marines on Guam is going to affect proximity as a factor for 
protest; however, the significant influence associated with exposure to military exercises 
has been significantly reduced by offsetting from densely populated areas. Considering the 
mitigation measures to offset operational impacts, a high-profile crime or accident is the 
event most likely to influence proximity. At the nascent stages of the realignment to Guam, 
it would be prudent to introduce liberty policies for the rotational Marine forces like those 
in Okinawa until social impacts and responses can be assessed.  
2. Sovereignty Concerns 
There are limited indications that protest is likely to increase in Guam in the near 
future. The DPRI has taken extensive precautions so as not to incite protest over the 
military buildup in Guam. However, unfavorability toward the U.S. bases could manifest 
for many various reasons. If protest in Guam were to increase, it would likely coalesce 
around sovereignty concerns. Like on Okinawa, Guam’s protests are partly fueled by 
concerns over land expropriation, democratic responsiveness, desire for federal voting 
rights (or, in Okinawa, for more influence to be attached to the voting rights they do already 
enjoy), and environmental awareness. Currently, local level support for the U.S. military 
in Guam is high, and this will be critical to maintain to prevent base policy from exposure 
to domestic political pressure in the future.  
a. Land Expropriation 
The 2010 environmental impact statement (EIS), overseen by the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD), evaluating new base construction on Guam, laid out considerations for 
acquiring an additional 688 acres of civilian-owned land. In 2012, after significant efforts 
were undertaken to engage the Guamanian public and government, the DOD made 
significant concessions and reduced the total number of Marines relocating to Guam from 
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8,600 to 5,000.223 Furthermore, the EIS recommended avoiding further land acquisition 
on Guam and the U.S. DOD decided to construct the new Marine base on federally owned 
land in Finegayan.224  
This critical decision to avoid further land acquisition is likely to reduce prospects 
for Guamanian base protest with respect to violation of sovereignty. Land expropriation 
for U.S. bases in Okinawa during WWII was one of that location’s greatest drivers of 
modern protest. The 1956 Price Report, directed by the U.S. House of Representatives’ 
Armed Services Committee, detailed the expropriation of approximately 45,000 acres on 
Okinawa for U.S. basing. Foundational in fueling U.S. base protest was the narrative of 
Okinawans’ “fighting to reclaim their land.”225 
Debates about U.S. land ownership on Guam are minimal due to U.S. control of the 
island ever since the Treaty of Paris ceded the territory to the U.S. government after victory 
in the 1898 Spanish-American War. While there have been several instances of the 
Chamorro people of Guam filing lawsuits against new federally funded construction 
projects, these demands tend to be satisfied with assurances for safe handling of ancient 
Chamorro remains. While mobilized protest in Guam is minimal compared to Okinawa, 
the latest instance was in late 2019 when more than 2,000 people gathered “to voice their 
discontent, express solidarity with one another, and demand CHamoru [sic] self-
determination” as a result of the prospects of federal land annexation.226 The protest 
occurred during a Guam legislative committee hearing to deliberate on the construction of 
the Northwest Firing Range on Andersen AFB. Guam’s representative Senator Telena Cruz 
addressed the protesters, and the event did not impact the proceedings.227  
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b. Democratic Responsiveness 
Earlier chapters established Okinawa’s grievances and professed subjugation at the 
hand of Tokyo. “There are similar complaints on Guam, a 30-mile-long tropical island of 
only 160,000 people, which is already home to large air force and naval bases.”228 
Natividad, one of the island’s most vocal opponents of the Marine relocation, argues that 
“the whole Guam buildup was set in motion because we’re a U.S. colony, and they think 
they can do whatever they want with our land.”229  
Despite being legal U.S. citizens, Guamanians do not pay federal taxes or take part 
in U.S. federal democracy: “they vote for local legislature, a governor, and a delegate to 
the U.S. House of Representatives—a delegate who cannot vote—but their choice for 
president, marked on the same ballot, carries no weight.”230 In 2016, Guam’s Governor, 
Eddie Baza Calvo, stated, “This American territory is not enjoying democracy… It’s up to 
our people to decide which way to go: whether to be fully in union with the United States 
or chart a separate course.”231 Dave Lotz, a local historian on Guam since 1970, further 
characterized the lack of democracy in that “The future of the island and the people here is 
decided by the Pentagon, not the people of Guam.”232 
There is an inherent dissonance in federal decision-making for U.S. basing between 
Okinawa and Guam. Okinawans retained a right to vote in federal elections—Guamanians 
do not. Guamanians have less of an ability to act upon their grievances. With respect to 
democratic responsiveness, there are grounds for elevated future protest in Guam over the 
fact that the U.S. federal government is not beholden to a constituency in Guam. 
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c. Desire for Federal Voting Rights 
Guam’s citizens have desired commonwealth status ever since the Northern 
Mariana Islands gained such status in 1976.233 Guamanians are granted U.S. citizenship 
through the 1950 Organic Act of the Territorial Government of Guam; however, this act 
does not authorize federal voting rights. Guam’s representatives in the U.S. Congress do 
not have voting power.234 In 1982, a poll found that 73% of respondents favored 
commonwealth that would lead to statehood.235 In 2020, one resident who moved to Guam 
from California stated, “I am deeply unhappy that as a U.S. citizen formerly residing on 
the mainland, I have to give up my voting rights for president simply by moving to another 
part of the US.”236 
Statham argues that the citizens of Guam have a natural right to statehood or 
independence and that it is unconstitutional for the U.S. to retain Guam, and its citizens, as 
a “possession.”237 In 2016, the Governor of Guam, Eddie Calvo, stated, “Guamanian 
soldiers have gone to fight in countries so they can have democracy and vote, yet we have 
never voted for the person who sends us to war.”238 In 2020, six Guamanian citizens filed 
a class action suit in federal court with residents of the U.S. Virgin Islands to obtain voting 
power in presidential elections.239 
The legal restraint over Guamanian’s voting power to impact U.S. basing policy 
will likely factor in future levels of increased protest. This condition factored heavily on 
Okinawan’s perceived lack of power to change U.S. base policy even while retaining the 
power to vote in federal elections. Disenfranchisement brought on by lack of representation 
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over laws imposed is a politically popular issue. It is likely, in the event an unpopular base 
policy is passed, that popular support will swing to a platform supporting federal voting 
rights. 
d. Environmental Awareness 
Given the current DPRI realignment plan, there are relatively limited 
environmental impacts associated with Guam. Construction projects are extremely 
scrutinized for cultural and environmental impacts given the political atmosphere on 
Guam, especially in comparison to typical civilian projects. However, more consideration 
might be given to potential impacts if the current trend of military force buildup in the 
Pacific persists. Mitchell details both the environmental impacts that were brought by 
military operations during the Cold War and evidence of increased environmental concerns 
among Guamanians. Elected officials in Guam have increased rhetoric “stridently speak 
[ing] out against the damage to their island.”240 Mitchell also details modern instances of 
increased “spills and dumps of fuel, pesticides, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances 
(PFAS), asbestos, and lead” contamination associated with U.S. bases abroad, to include 
Guam.241 
Mitchell warns of existential consequences in the Marshall island region from the 
nuclear tests that were conducted by the U.S. after WWII: “[when] the U.S. detonated the 
equivalent of more than ten Hiroshima-sized bombs a week for a dozen years, the 
explosions were so destructive that regional maps had to be redrawn because some small 
islands had been vaporized.”242 The American Cancer Society designated the region 
“extreme” when comparing cancer rates to other regions in the world. Another impending 
flashpoint is the eroding concrete enclosure that sealed approximately 110,000 tons of 
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radioactive material into a nuclear crater on Runit Island.243 Increased environmental 
awareness among the Pacific Island populations is likely to accompany future increases in 
U.S. force buildup in the Pacific.  
While political activism in Guam is limited, especially when compared to Okinawa, 
the preponderance of activist groups revolves around the military buildup on the island. 
“We are Guahan” is a small activist group on Guam that protests the Marine buildup 
primarily on the premise of environmental impacts imposed by military facilities and 
operations. The group was founded around 2009–2010 after a group of volunteers agreed 
to meet weekly and review the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pertaining to 
construction plans for the new Marine Corps base on Guam.244 The group has a mailing 
list and Facebook following of approximately 2,000 (or 1% of Guam’s population) where 
it regularly publicizes identified environmental impacts of current military operations.245 
The group attempted to sue the DOD when plans for the current shooting range at 
Northwest Field on Andersen AFB was in development – but these grievances had little 
political impact on Guam.246 We are Guahan joined other environmental activist groups 
on Guam to obtain 8,000 signatures to protest the shooting range on grounds that “the lead 
from the bullets in the range could contaminate the aquifer that provides drinking water to 
the entire island.”247 Guam’s Coastal Management Program and Environmental Protection 
Agency determined that the Northern Guam Lens aquifer, the primary source of potable 
water for 80% of the population, is not at risk as a result of construction projects or in 
violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act.248 
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e. Elevated Level of Local Support  
In April 2011, U.S. Senators James Webb and Carl Levin met with local 
government officials in Guam who conveyed general support by the population of the 
Marine realignment and subsequent increased force presence.249 There is a significant 
contingent of native islanders who strongly support the U.S. military and emphasize its 
positive pathway for advancement to youth and families. A factor that contributes to this 
sentiment is the disparity in living standards between military members and indigenous 
Guamanians. Guam observes “among the highest recruitment levels [for the U.S. military] 
in the nation.”250 U.S. military service is highly revered in Guam and many families boast 
about generations of military service; “One in every 20 of Guam’s 165,000 residents is a 
military veteran, according to the U.S. census.”251 Parents encourage children to enlist 
because “In many young people’s minds the military service is the tried-and-true road to 
wealth and well-being and so they quickly get with the program.”252 This social dynamic 
is likely to be reinforced if Marines continue to be viewed favorably in the community. 
Guam’s Congresswoman, Madeleine Bordallo, highlighted the positive economic 
impacts to the Marine relocation to Guam. She stated, “Guam, which has a historically 
symbiotic relationship with the military, will benefit significantly from the associated 
investments [from the Marine realignment] in our community.”253 Congresswoman 
Bordallo believes the strong military partnership “could position Guam as a regional hub 
for IT infrastructure,” likely reducing the economy’s dependence on tourism.254 Guam’s 
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Labor Force Participation Rate was 57.9% in 2018, compared to the U.S. 62.9%.255 Since 
2018, approximately 5% of Guam’s residents work for the military bases and are employed 
by the U.S. federal government.256 Some on Guam favor the Marine realignment because 
“The U.S. federal government puts $600 million a year into Guam through Social Security 
and taxes paid by military personnel stationed here. That’s not including food stamps and 
school lunches and things like that.”257 An economic impact survey, funded by the DOD, 
found that the new Marine base would bring roughly 3,000 full-time civilian employment 
opportunities, and generate $40 million a year for Guam tax revenue projected by 2021.258 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are limited indications that, absent a high-profile crime or accident, U.S. base 
protest will increase on Guam as a result of the DPRI. It is evident that the DPRI has 
mitigated many of the drivers of U.S. base protest that were identified in Okinawa and 
across Northeast Asia. It can be presumed that if grievances surmount to elevated levels of 
protest, the U.S. government will respond with economic or policy concessions to the 
Guamanian citizens. Grievances will likely manifest from the social impact brought on by 
additional Marines, increased awareness of environmental impacts as a byproduct of 
military operations, and citizens’ desire for federal representation to influence base policy. 
Many Okinawans had expressed enmity toward Tokyo over sluggish responses to 
referendums to change U.S. base policy—and Okinawans retain national-level voting 
rights. Some Guamanian natives have expressed similar concerns, and activism has 
targeted the Marine realignment and new base construction at Andersen AFB. These 
grievances are likely to coalesce and amplify over not having federal voting rights in Guam. 
These pressures will likely be alleviated to a degree by the large veteran population in 
Guam that supports the U.S. military, and by the potential economic opportunities brought 
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by new jobs from the growing base. The DPRI has taken significant measures to mitigate 
drivers of base protest by offsetting military exercises and avoiding additional land 
expropriation. Overall, the level of base protest in Guam will likely not reach levels 
observed in Okinawa – if high-profile crimes perpetrated by Marines, rapid influxes of 
military presence, and environmental disasters can be prevented. These events are the 
likely triggers for activism to coalesce into a significant protest movement. Diplomatic and 
DOD officials must implement mitigation measures to prevent triggers that might risk the 
access and military operations on Guam required to uphold U.S. ideals and interests in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
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IV. MOVING FORWARD 
Forward military basing in Northeast Asia enhances U.S. capacity to maintain a 
regional balance of power that promotes peace, stability, and freedom through an 
alliance structure predicated on rules based democratic ideals. A shift in the regional 
balance of power and authority could jeopardize the duration of such ideals unless 
stakeholders in the alliance respond to the challenge to the status quo. The U.S.-Japan 
alliance effectively reinforced a shift in this balance by transferring a significant 
contingent of Marine forces farther out of the region. The impetus of the shift was not 
the immediate challenge of the status quo but protest in Okinawa, which had reached an 
inflection point in 1995. Ever since, the momentum of antibase sentiments, bolstered by 
proximity and perceptions of imposition on sovereignty, has led the U.S. to increase its 
efforts to reduce the burden of hosting U.S. forces on Okinawa. This thesis’ major 
finding is that factors of proximity had the greatest influence on protest in Okinawa. 
Efforts to reduce protest, outlined in the DPRI, have led to base consolidations 
throughout Japan—reducing U.S. forward posture in the region. It is evident DPRI will 
reduce overall U.S. base protest in East Asia; however, the alliance will have to modify 
basing policy to maintain a credible forward presence that effectively confronts 
existential security challenges.  
A. MULTILATERAL HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
The structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the region has also shifted from one 
of interoperability to one of interdependence. With the relative decline in U.S. forward 
presence, it becomes more critical for Japan to take a more active role in its security and 
capacity for effective deterrence. Today, the JSDF is becoming more of an instrument 
of foreign policy leveraged by the GOJ. However, the GOJ “continues to shy away from 
difficult choices when it comes to planning for the use of force.”259 The JSDF has the 
capability and capacity to confront military challenges in the region, but the GOJ also 
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faces the difficult task of informing its constituents of the actions required to defend the 
rules based order and democracy in the region.  
Japan’s basing policies must evolve with the security relationship to enhance 
military cooperation. Armitage and Nye assert that the U.S.-Japan alliance must agree 
to a Host Nation Support Agreement “as soon as possible.”260 This policy change would 
allow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planners to operationalize Japan’s 
defense posture in the region. A formal, prearranged policy that authorizes NATO forces 
to operate from Japanese territory would improve the alliance’s capability and 
credibility to support peace, crisis, and war operations. JSDF and NATO planners could 
utilize more Japanese territory and key access options to support multilateral exercises 
and operations in the region. To advance this agenda, Armitage and Nye insist that Japan 
and South Korea relationship must evolve within the alliance by “focus [ing] on the 
future, and not the past.”261 
Projections indicate that the DPRI will reduce political pressure on U.S. access 
in Okinawa and mitigate its drivers in Guam; however, the U.S.-Japan alliance faces 
new challenges with the shift in the balance of power in the region. Participant nations 
of the international order maintain the capability and capacity to collectively respond to 
the challenge of the status quo, but relationships among countries, and policies, must 
evolve with the existential multipolar security environment. Democratic nations must 
overcome past generational grievances associated with wartime conflict to effectively 
cooperate and combat the prospects of authoritarian oppression in the region. The U.S.-
Japan alliance, and respective administrations, must address these challenges and co-
lead the new multipolar world.262 
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B. TRAJECTORY OF U.S. BASING IN OKINAWA  
A recent decade-long construction delay for the Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma Replacement Facility, or FRF, complicates near term conjecture about 
levels of protest in Okinawa.263 MCAS Futenma is arguably the most protested U.S. 
forward base in the world and construction for its relocation to Camp Schwab was 
originally projected to be complete by 2022; however, the recent discovery of weak 
foundation issues and deep fault lines requires 77,000 sand pillars and has delayed 
anticipated completion out to 2032.264 Moreover, protests at the construction sites in 
2019 significantly extended delays, only allowing for 1% of the planned landfill work 
to be completed; Lummis notes, “At that rate, landfill will be completed in 100 
years.”265 It is likely that airfield operations at Futenma will continue well into the near 
future.  
The nature of compensation politics between the GOJ and Okinawa and age 
demographics in Okinawa, though, shed some light on the long-term trajectory of protest 
in Okinawa.  
1. Implications for Compensation Politics 
Without a significant disruption, compensation politics will likely regulate U.S. 
base protest at levels that do not intensify pressure on current U.S. force posture. While 
the GOJ’s efforts at burden reduction (futan keigen) in Okinawa, predominantly in the 
form of increased subsidies, fail to address Okinawa’s underlying grievances toward 
Tokyo, they are effective at maintaining the status quo. Cooley describes a substantial 
number of compensation initiatives and voter data that depict a structurally “stable 
political equilibrium” that has allowed the GOJ and Washington to “secure Okinawa’s 
majority acquiescence to the continuing U.S. presence.”266 Okinawa is the least wealthy 
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prefecture in Japan, and between 1972 and 1999 Tokyo provided over 5 trillion yen in 
subsidies.267 However, Gintautas alleges that an “overreliance on compensation politics 
in Okinawa … has created systemic risks that pose a threat to the long-term political 
sustainability of the [US forces in Okinawa].”268 
According to Calder, compensation politics work if “(1) resource flows continue 
unabated to target constituencies, and (2) no ambitious base relocation efforts are 
pursued.”269 Gintautas finds potential for economic and social changes to disrupt the 
flow of compensation to Okinawan citizens.270 In FY2018, Japan’s compensation 
budget for Okinawa was 6–8% of the total defense budget, or .35% of Japan’s total 
budget. Gintautas underscores the fact that Japan’s “government debt relative to GDP is 
the highest ever recorded in the OECD area,” introduces risk for disrupting 
compensation.271 Japan’s declining economic prospects, largely attributed to its aging 
population and low birth rates, potentially jeopardize the long-term sustainability of 
compensation politics. 
In addition to potential future budgetary constraints’ disrupting, or eliminating, 
compensation to Okinawans, “other changes such as the election of a less hawkish prime 
minister, a reduction in tensions with North Korea or China, domestic pushes to increase 
welfare spending, or even a surge in Japanese antimilitarism or nationalism, all have the 
potential to interrupt the flow of compensation payments that have thus far secured 
Okinawan acquiescence for U.S. forces in Okinawa.”272 Oros illustrates this distinction 
during the DPJ’s short term as the majority, from 2009–12, when the Diet took actions 
to distance itself from the United States and balance priorities more toward an Asia for 
Asians. In fact, one of the DPJ’s three “primary goals for change in Japan’s security 
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practices” was “closer ties to China and other Asian states.”273 It is not entirely out of 
the question that Japan would distance itself from the U.S.-Japan alliance if the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) were to lose its dominance in the Diet and the opposition came 
to power for longer than a few years. 
To Calder’s second point, compensation politics only work in the absence of 
ambitious base relocation efforts as vested interests desire to maintain the basing status 
quo.274 Efforts such as SACO and the DPRI could have unintended consequences such 
as increasing protest as fewer Okinawans are coopted. Figure 20 presents the collective 
efforts of the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement and the 
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Both SACO and DPRI represent significant 
efforts aimed to consolidate or reduce U.S. bases on Okinawa. Gintautas argues that 
base reductions and relocations can actually intensify protest after the “burden” 
demanding compensation no longer exists. This presents significant political 
ramifications as there are over 43,000 landowners in Okinawa who receive 
approximately ¥ 362.8 billion (roughly $3.28 billion) annually for hosting U.S. bases.275 
Gintautas adds this will “reduce overall political support for the remaining bases since 
the co-opted supporters lose their economic incentives to continue supporting base 
presence.”276 While base reductions may ease the burden and reduce protest in local 
communities, the wealthy faction of landowners are likely to contribute to increased 
protest once no longer compensated. 
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Figure 20. SACO Land Return (left) and DPRI Marine 
Relocations.277 
2. Okinawan Demographics and Implications for Protest  
Gintautas proposes that as the Battle of Okinawa age cohort begins to disappear, 
protest will likely decrease. While the greatest policy concern among Okinawan voters 
is resolving the U.S. base problem (Figure 21), many scholars argue this is representative 
of one particular cohort rather than an issue consistently represented within an age 
demographic. Johnston notes, “the core anti-base protesters are older; many were 
children during the Battle of Okinawa in 1945.”278 Morrison and Chinen identify a 
condition of “base fatigue” among 60 millennials who were interviewed and who reside 
in Okinawa.279 Two-thirds of those interviewed had never participated in mobilized 
protests in Okinawa and elected that protests were ineffective at producing real policy 
changes.280 Gintautas provides empirical evidence that base issues tend to be less 
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important among younger Okinawans (Figure 22). Between the ages of 15–29, 71.3% 
of Okinawan respondents ranked U.S. base issues as being below their top three policy 
concerns. The director of the Vancouver-based Peace Philosophy Centre agrees with 
Gintautas’ observations and adds that “the traditional anti-base movement is rapidly 
aging.”281 He argues, “Protesters tend to use the same tactics as they did back in the 
1960s — which turns off younger Okinawans and mainland Japanese who move to 
Okinawa. I think young people come to places where they can participate, feel respected 
and have fun, not to places where they have to listen to boring speeches of old people 
one after the other.”282 Evidence suggests U.S. base protest in Okinawa will decline 
over time regardless of future compensation or concessions made by the GOJ.  
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Figure 21. Okinawan Public Policy Priorities (2015) 283 
 
283 Source: Gintautas, Loosening the Okinawan Knot, 63. 
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Figure 22. Base Problems, Top Three Public Policy Priority Across 
Ages (15-year groups)284 
C. TWO BASING STRATEGIES FOR CONSIDERATION   
1. “Singapore Model” Supplemented with JSDF 
If Okinawan political issues do reduce the future viability of the island as a U.S. 
basing option, though, Kent Calder proposes a scalable force option in his “Singapore 
Model,” characterized by a substantially smaller U.S. footprint of planning, legal, 
logistical, and intelligence personnel well connected with host-nation and higher-echelon 
military planners and intelligence assets. The base would require a small footprint of U.S. 
service members that would facilitate reception of forces for large scale operations if 
directed. This would reduce the “contact” of U.S. service members within high-density 
population centers and civilian exposure to military exercises, while maintaining 
operational situational awareness. Such a base could accommodate prepositioned 
equipment near a carrier dry-dock, as with the U.S. military footprint in Singapore.285 
Alleviated from the pressure (comparatively) from host-nation protest, the DOD could 
maintain and operate from multiple access points rather than concentrating forces and 
presenting an adversary with first strike advantages. Multiple access points from different 
strategic locations across an array of different countries would increase situational 
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awareness of the operating environment and offer more operational maneuver and strike 
options.  
A second prong to this model would be supplementing the U.S. force reduction on 
Okinawa with an increased presence of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). This would 
alleviate protest associated with cultural insensitivities, issues of sovereignty violation, and 
elevated reactions to crime perpetrated by U.S. service members. The Japanese 
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade operates in similar fashion to the USMC, and 
Okinawan training facilities and infrastructure could support more bi/multilateral venues 
for U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Operationally, access would be maintained for the 
USMC by an ally force, and exercises could simulate bilateral contingency responses that 
would deploy from Okinawa. The existing infrastructure could serve as staging areas for 
pre-positioned assets and requisite logistics much as it exists today. Naha Port alone has 
over 7 deep water berths that could support massive naval fleet and troop movements.286  
2. Status Quo: Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) 
A second option would be to maintain the status quo while resuming efforts to 
relocate MCAS Futenma—FRF. The United States has yet to see the impacts the FRF will 
have on protest. Protest in Okinawa has the same prospects of reversal toward heightened 
U.S. favorability as observed after forces were relocated out of Seoul in South Korea. The 
relocation would reduce Okinawans’ exposure to U.S. forces’ military exercises, crime, 
and sovereignty violations. Existing literature finds that protest is dynamic and varies over 
time. It is also possible that over time, Okinawans’ external threat perception is heightened 
and protest decreases on its own. It is also worth noting that some might argue that protest 
in Okinawa is not intense enough for concessions to be made. Pagan contends that despite 
Okinawans’ best efforts, they “remain fragmented and unable to raise their concerns to the 
proper audience and agenda setting level, [and] the status quo will remain in effect.”287  
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